ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage

202-347-3700

800-336-6646

410-684-2550

DAV/loj

	Nationwide Coverage 202-347-3700 800-336-6646 410-684-2550
22	On behalf of Agency ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
21	Philadelphia, PA 19103
20	1650 Arch Street
19	Office of Regional Counsel, 3RC30
18	Region III
17	Environmental Protection Agency
16	JOHN RUGGERO, ESQ.
15	CHERYL JAMIESON, ESQ.
14	
13	On behalf of Appelant
12	Charleston, WV 25322
11	P.O. Box 553
10	1600 Laidley Tower
9	JACKSON KELLY, PLLC
8	EDWARD L. KROPP, ESQ.
7	
6	On behalf of Appelant
5	Baltimore, MD 21202
4	10 Light Street
3	Miles & Stockbridge, P.C.
2	MARIAN C. HWANG, ESQ.
1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

PROCEEDINGS

2

1

(10:30 a.m.)

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

JUDGE FULTON: Good morning and welcome. Argument this morning will proceed in accordance with the Board's Order dated October 4, 2006.

As specified in that Order, each side will have 30 minutes for argument. Environmental Services, Inc., also known as EPS, as the Appellant in this proceeding, will proceed first, and may reserve five minutes of its allotted time for rebuttal, if it wishes.

We received a motion from Region III in this matter, requesting from the Board, assistance in narrowing the issues for purposes of argument. gave this consideration, but declined to accede to that request, preferring, instead, to leave it to the ' parties to prioritize their arguments as they saw fit, in the time allowed for argument this morning.

As the parties are aware, a confidential business information claim has been asserted with respect to certain information in the record of this It's my understanding that the parties do not case.

intend to refer to confidential business information during the course of this argument.

However, in the event that a question by the Board should call for you, or if you should otherwise find it helpful to refer to confidential business information, please so advise the Board before answering the question. We will then ask you to defer that answer till the end of the hearing, at which time, if necessary, we will close the hearing and clear the courtroom, in order that we may preserve the confidentiality of anything that's alleged to be claimed as confidential business information.

We look very much forward to hearing the parties' arguments this morning, and your perspectives on the issues presented to us, and while we will no doubt benefit from your prepared remarks, we trust that you will appreciate that the primary value of oral argument to the Board, is in bringing further clarity to our understanding of the arguments presented in the briefs, and we hope that you'll be indulgent of and responsive to our questions, to the

-	best of your ability.
2	So, let us begin then by asking counsel to
3	identify themselves for the record, starting with
4	counsel for EPS.
5	MS. HWANG: Good morning, Your Honor,
6	Marian Hwang with Miles & Stockbridge, on behalf of
7	the Appellant, and with me is co-counsel Mr. Edward
8	Kropp, with the firm of Jackson & Kelly.
9	JUDGE FULTON: And my understanding is
LÖ	that you'll both be presenting as part of the
L1	argument this morning?
12	MR. KROPP: Correct, Your Honor.
L 3	JUDGE FULTON: Okay. And for EPA Region
L4	III?
L5	MS. JAMIESON: Cheryl Jamieson, US EPA
L6	Region III. I will be presenting the oral argument.
L7	I do have co-counsel available, if necessary.
L 8	JUDGE FULTON: And your co-counsel?
L 9	MS. JAMIESON: John Ruggero.
20	JUDGE FULTON: Okay, very good. All
21	right, without further ado, then, Ms. Hwang?
22	MS. HWANG: Good morning, Judges Wolgast,

2

3

4

:5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Fulton, and Stein.

May it please the Court, my name is

Marian, and, as I said earlier, I, along with cocounsel, Mr. Kropp, do represent the Appellant,

Environmental Protection Services, EPS, in this
matter.

We will be dividing our argument in two:

I will be devoting approximately 12 minutes for the

defense of selective enforcement, and Mr. Kropp will

be devoting another 12 minutes in defense of the

substantive matters contained in the Complaint.

We will reserve five minutes for rebuttal.

JUDGE FULTON: Thank you.

MS. HWANG: For the reasons more fully set forth in our brief, we respectfully request that the initial Order be reversed.

We know this Court has reviewed the briefs and is familiar with the applicable law, but we would like to take a moment, if we may, to present a few issues and arguments to elucidate the issues and put them in proper perspective for the Court, however, we are at your pleasure and we will be happy to take

22987.ALL DAV/wet

. 5

questions now or later, as the Court wishes.

But if I may, to prevail in this case of selective enforcement, EPS must show, among other factors, that other similarly-situated violators were left untouched.

And this case is before the EAB precisely because a similarly-situated violator was left untouched. We are before this Board because of a need for a level playing field and the need for the TSCA PCB regulations set forth at 40 CFR 761, to be applied in a uniform, consistent manner, which we believe has not been done in this case.

This is a case about two similar companies, both companies having similar operations, similar equipment, at one point, similar customer bases, providing the same type of services -- PCB waste disposal services.

And yet that is where the similarity ends. We have two different regions, Regions II and III, and headquarters, applying, purportedly, the same laws, the same regulations, but reaching vastly different resulting conclusions.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

On the one side, you have EPS, the

Appellant in this case. It's a small company located
in West Virginia, under the jurisdiction of Region

III.

Over the years, it lost its customer base, utility customers, to a company called G&S.

EPS is regulated under Part 761. It has a commercial storage approval permit; it's subject to permit limits and storage limits; it has financial assurances; it has a closure plan; and it's subject to all of the panoply of requirements contained in 761.

On the other side, you have another similar company, G&S. It's located in New Jersey in Region II. It's a very large company. Today, we believe it is the largest PCB waste disposal company in the United States.

For over ten years, EPS has complained about the fact that G&S has been allowed to operate outside of the scope and purview of 761, and, in fact, G&S does not have a commercial storage approval; it's not subject to any limits; no

financial assurances; no closure plan; it is virtually unregulated.

And how do we know this? Not only have we mentioned the fact that EPS's customers have, over the years, gone to G&S, but if you look at Exhibit -- Plaintiff's Exhibit 401 in the record, Your Honor, here is a brochure from EPS -- I'm sorry, G&S, which states that not only has it grown into the largest oil-filled electrical equipment disposal facility on the East Coast, but that it also provides other services such as onsite dielectric fluid disposal of all PCB levels, and that it also handles electrical equipment disposal and onsite field dismantling.

Assuming that we were to agree with you,
hypothetically, that the two companies are treated
differently for regulatory purposes, how does that,
in and of itself, establish the claim of selective
enforcement?

Don't you have additional things to prove in the form of bad faith?

MS. HWANG: Yes, Your Honor, we do. And

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

22987.ALL DAV/wet

1

2

3

4 :5

6

7

8

9

10

12

11

13

14

15.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

we, in the record, have set forth the various criteria that we believe have been satisfied.

We start first with the underlying premise of the dissimilar treatment of two violators, but we also believe, Your Honor, that the bad faith can be demonstrated.

We look at and rely on language that is found in the Smithfield Foods case, Your Honor, where Smithfield specifically said EPA, to have selected EPS -- excuse me, Your Honor -- where Smithfield specifically said that the basis for going after and singling out a regulated party such as EPS, has to be also shown that the decision to prosecute, should not be based on unjustifiable standards or other arbitrary classifications.

That language is right out of the Smithfield case on page 985, and that is the premise of our bad-faith claim in this matter, Your Honor, that EPA had no justifiable basis or standard and that its prosecution of EPS, was based on an arbitrary classification.

And if you would like, Your Honor, I would

. 5

be happy to jump to our second question, our second issue in this matter, because I think it will elucidate and respond more fully to your question.

JUDGE FULTON: But, before you do that, how do you contend with the language in Smithfield which contemplates action that is taken invidiously or in bad faith?

MS. HWANG: Your Honor, in Smithfield at page 985, the Court, in trying to clarify what is bad faith, in almost a direct quote, states -- and I'd be happy to share that language here, Your Honor --

(Pause.)

of how you define bad faith. And what I find instructive in this language, is that the Court described the discretion of the Agencies to be clearly subject to Constitutional constraints, which must ensure that any decision to prosecute a particular person, is not based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.

And, if you will, the arbitrary

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

202-347-3700

22987.ALL DAV/wet

. 5

б

classification concern that we have in this case, is based on the underlying reason for the inspection in the first place.

At Complainant's Exhibit 7, this is a internal memo that prepared by EPA, undated. I'll just flip it up a little bit. It's a two-page document appearing on pages -- part of Complaint's Exhibit, 30 pages, 1019 and 1020.

But if you look at the underlying reason for inspection, EPA based its underlying inspection, the premise of its underlying inspection, because it had expressed serious concerns regarding EPS's extreme rush to release trust fund dollars -- the extreme rush to release trust fund dollars.

The record is clear that EPS had a trust fund, and the trust fund satisfied the specific regulatory requirements of the regulations. The regulations at 761, incorporate the requirements of CFR 264.15(a)(1), which made clear that if you have a trust fund, that trust fund is irrevocable and cannot be terminated and is controlled by the holder of the trust fund. In this case, this would be EPA.

2

3 4

. 5

7

6

8

9

10

11

13

12

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

So, for EPA to say that they were concerned about a rush to judgment by EPS to release the trust fund, is illusory; it's pretextual.

There was no legal right by EPS to release the trust fund; they couldn't do it, and for EPA to say that they were concerned about an extreme rush to judgment, is just inaccurate, as a matter of law.

JUDGE STEIN: Do you have any evidence beyond the face of that document, that suggests that the inspection was a pretext?

I mean, it strikes me that on the face of the document, it's not clearly inappropriate for EPA to conduct an inspection of a regulated entity.

I quess my question is, is your sole evidence of pretext, found on the face of the document, or do you have any other indicia of bad faith?

MS. HWANG: We have -- there is plenty indicia of bad faith, Your Honor. EPS, for over ten years, made efforts to correct the inequity vis a vis G&S, and so, over the years, it had requested meetings with EPA, had met with officials in Region

2

3

4

:5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

II, including Mr. Webb, who was the Enforcement

Director in Region III, and constantly repeated these
themes or the theme of the inequity with respect to

G&S.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Could I interrupt you for a second there? What I'm struggling with, is that it seems to me that these are two different actions on the part of EPA.

I appreciate your comment of the importance of a level playing field, and you allege that Region II has interpreted the same regulations differently than Region III, to your Company's detriment.

I understand that argument, but I'm having trouble fitting that disparity in interpretation under the column of selective prosecution.

As you say, that goes to EPA's decision to prosecute and whether there was bad faith in their decision to go forward with a prosecution, given the facts that they found on the days of the inspection at issue.

MS. HWANG: Your Honor, with respect to

.5

the bad faith, we have a trail of evidence leading from the officials of Region III, who, from the very beginning -- excuse me, from the officials of Region II, who were being, in a way, almost badgered by EPS about EPS's concerns about G&S.

Then you have a trail of communications from Region II to Region III, asking -- on one day, an official in Region II made an inquiry about the compliance and enforcement history of G&S -- excuse me, I'm sorry -- making a compliance inquiry of EPS.

This is an official in Region II, inquiring about a matter in Region III. You have emails from this official in Region II, asking Region III, what is the status of the enforcement; are you going to bring a complaint; are you going to bring an investigation?

All of these communications are outlined in our brief, and when you have that level of communication between the parties, and you have the underlying purpose of the investigations, which explicitly say, in EPA's own memos, that the purpose was because of a concern for rush to judgment to

15.

release funds, which could not, as a practical matter, occur. That is incorrect and that's where the bad faith is.

If one wanted to be punitive, one could find any number of reasons or rationales to try to go investigation and ultimately find a violation, but here, in the words, of the Agency itself, the underlying premise for that investigation, was clearly false.

Moreover, the fact that EPA had information about EPS's request for a change of financial assurance, months and years earlier, before the actual investigations, Region III never put on its own calendar and plans, a schedule to do a routine compliance inspection of EPS. It was something that was done at the last minute, a special request.

If I may, Your Honor, what I would like to also -- in that context, Your Honor, I would like to bring to the Court's attention, the evidence which clearly demonstrates that G&S was treated dissimilarly.

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

. 5

We have not only the brochures, but we also have the numerous contracts from the various utilities -- and these are customers of G&S -- that make clear that when these utilities were shipping PCB waste to G&S, they were clearly expressing an intention that this waste be disposed of.

And that distinction of disposal, is critical, because, under Section 761.3, if the PCB is brokered for disposal, the receiving facility must be regulated as a commercial storage facility.

And we have submitted an ample record covering three days of testimony, 80 exhibits, which make most clear that the contracts and communications between G&S and its customers, were that G&S receive PCB waste for disposal.

And, in fact, if one looks at G&S's own letter that it submitted to EPA, G&S admits in its Surplus Evaluation Arrangement -- sorry, there's a shadow here.

This is Respondent's Exhibit 243, which indicates that for any PCB over 50, G&S will be disposing of that equipment. G&S will drain all

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

:5

three liquids and the liquids will be disposed at safety cleaning. The drained PCB-contaminated units will be disposed in our metal --

And, further, units testing 500 PPM of PCB and over, will be removed from service and disposed of by us.

JUDGE FULTON: Ms. Hwang, I just want to check in on time at this point. Mr. Kropp will be addressing other subjects, I guess, other than selective prosecution. We're running a little bit over on the time set up for selective prosecution, however, I have a few more questions on this topic, so maybe you can wrap up and then we'll see what additional questions the Judges may have on this issue, before turning it over Mr. Kropp.

MS. HWANG: Thank you, Your Honor. Just in wrapping up, it is EPS's position that there is no room in this matter for any difference of opinion.

The fact that G&S is not regulated and that G&S -- and that EPS is regulated, is not merely a matter of a difference of opinion, as expressed in the initial Order.

22987.ALL DAV/wet

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Either an entity is subject to 761, or they are not. If EPS is subject to 761, then we submit that G&S also must be regulated, and since G&S is not regulated under 761, then EPS must prevail in its selective enforcement defense. Alternatively, if G&S is not subject to 761, then the same should apply and be true of EPS. In either case, EPS's claims -- excuse me -- in either case, EPA's claims against EPS must fail. And this case demands national uniformity. The Appellant is only seeking the fair and equal enforcement of the laws in this matter. JUDGE FULTON: Okay. All right, we'll have a few questions for you here, and this time will not be charged to Mr. Kropp, okay? MS. HWANG: Thank you, Your Honor. JUDGE FULTON: First of all, what is your understanding of the current regulatory status of G&S? There are some references in the record to G&S also applying for commercial storage approval. To your knowledge, has that occurred?

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

What is the current regulatory status of G&S?

1	MS. HWANG: It is my understanding that
2	G&S has never been authorized as a commercial storage
3	approved facility. It did apply many years ago, but,
4	ultimately, it was not issued the approval, and, in
:5	part, because of the positions by Region II, to allow
6	G&S to operate under two exceptions.
7	The first and primary exception was under
8	this resale exemption and this surplus arrangement.
9	JUDGE FULTON: Do you dispute that G&S, as
10	part of its business, does engage in the resale of
11	PCB particles?
12	MS. HWANG: We seriously dispute it.
13	Obviously, we are not G&S, but in this day and age,
14	with this market, we're talking about PCB electrical
15,	equipment that's outdated.
16	JUDGE FULTON: But it's the under-5-parts-
17	per-million universe, is what they're purporting to
18	resell, right? And so you dispute that they do
19	actually engage in resale?
20	MS. HWANG: G&S is also alleging that they
21	engage in the resale of units above 50, Your Honor.

-	manification, as we anacistant it, and are not subject
2	at all to commercial storage.
3	JUDGE FULTON: But, in your view, the
4	resale claim is just simply false; it's not part of
. 5	their business activity?
6	MS. HWANG: Your Honor, I relying on
7	EPA's records, not having firsthand knowledge of G&S,
8	I couldn't say with certainty, that they've never
9	done any resale.
LO	JUDGE FULTON: EPS does not maintain that
11	it engages in resale activities? That's not part of
12	EPS's business plan?
13	MS. HWANG: I will defer to my co-counsel,
L 4	since he will be handling those matters of the
L 5	Complaint.
L 6	JUDGE FULTON: Okay, maybe he can address
L7	that when he gets up.
L 8	You mentioned this arbitrary
19	classification concept, and I wanted to understand
20	where, as clearly as you can, where you see that
21	hooking into our case here. Is the arbitrary
22	classification, in your view, the decision to

. 5

regulate EPS as a commercial storage facility, or is it the inspection, or is it the invocation of the case, the prosecution itself?

Where is the arbitrary classification, in your view?

MS. HWANG: The arbitrariness in the classification, is with respect to which facility is going to be regulated under 761, as a commercial storage facility, and what is not.

With respect to G&S, where they are, in my client's knowledge and business, G&S is the largest waste disposal facility in the United States, not only the East Coast, but in the United States, and the fact that they are not even being licensed, permitted, or authorized, it would be like you and I, Your Honor, being allowed to drive without a license with our cars, while the rest -- while others may be subject to licenses.

And that's where it's an arbitrary standard, in addition to the fact that over the ten and a half years -- 15 years, Your Honor, that EPS has been complaining about this, very specific

22987.ALL DAV/wet

argument and advocacy with respect to justifying G&S's operations, have been made by Region II.

So you have that arbitrary nature of decisions being made with one set of laws applying to EPS and another set of law applying to G&S.

JUDGE FULTON: So when you talk about arbitrary classification, you really are focused on the decision of how to regulate, in the first instance, so decisions made by Region III to regulate EPS as a commercial storage facility, and decisions made by Region II to not regulate G&S, because that activity is not viewed as storage activity.

But that's where you see the arbitrariness coming in?

MS. HWANG: And, in addition, also, Your Honor, the fact that with respect to G&S, Region II has allowed and accepted certain exemptions in the regulations to apply to G&S, whereas in the case of EPS, where EPS is seeking to legitimately, legally avail itself of certain exemptions in the regulations, the initial Order has denied EPS that ability to operate with those exemptions, which, in

our view, are most clear.

And Mr. Kropp will be discussing those, but those relate to the self-implementing rules and the decontamination procedures.

JUDGE FULTON: Okay. Do you have any more questions for Ms. Hwang?

JUDGE STEIN: I just have one. Given that your fundamental issue is a difference in the regulatory status of the two facilities, and selective prosecution, as I understand it, relates to prosecuting one entity unfairly, I'm wondering how this particular set of circumstances, fits into the selective prosecution rubric, if the arbitrary classification itself, stems from the failure -- alleged failure of Region II to regulate, as opposed to the decision on the part of Region III to enforce against a regulated entity.

MS. HWANG: Your Honor, what is troubling in this case, is the fact that the regs provide for certain requirements for operations and exceptions and exemptions.

And where EPS is trying to operate to the

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

1	letter of the regulations, including availing itself
2	of exceptions in the regs, and yet those exceptions
3	are not being recognized by the Agency in its
4	enforcement action in the initial Order, versus the
5	fact that G&S is allowed to operate unfettered, not
6	regulated whatsoever, is most troubling, and because
7	there's this resale surplus arrangement that Region
8	II has fought very adamantly to support.
9	There is a string of e-mail between Region
10	II and Headquarters that indicate the level of
11	advocacy that Region II took to support this surplus
12	arrangement, despite the overwhelming evidence that
13	G&S was receiving PCB waste disposal equipment.
14	JUDGE FULTON: What's the practical impact
15	here? What is the commercial disadvantage that EPS
16	suffers in the midst of this kind of alleged
17	disparity?
18	MS. HWANG: It's devastating, Your Honor.
19	JUDGE FULTON: Can you briefly describe
20	the consequences?
21	MS. HWANG: Yes, Your Honor. Over the
22	past ten and half years, but particularly in the

-	beginning, most of Ers s defilely edscomers left.
2	JUDGE FULTON: Why, though? I'm
3	interested in understanding why. I understand
4	there's been a shift in the customer base, but why?
:5	MS. HWANG: Because sending the electrical
6	equipment, PCB waste equipment to G&S, was less
7	expensive, and there was less and I presume
8	JUDGE FULTON: Why is that?
9	MS. HWANG: Because G&S does not have to
L O	incur costs for regulatory compliance, no financial
11	assurances.
L2	JUDGE FULTON: What is the cost-producing
L3	element of regulatory compliance in this scenario?
L4 _.	MS. HWANG: Well, Your Honor
L5,	JUDGE FULTON: Is it the financial
16	assurance mechanism, having to maintain that; is that
L 7	the primary issue?
8 .	MS. HWANG: Financial assurance
١9	JUDGE FULTON: The other obligations don't
20	seem that to carry a big financial payload to
21	them. That's why I'm asking this question. Where is
22	the tension here, from an economic standpoint?

1 MS. HWANG: Your Honor, if I can speak on 2 behalf of the client, not having the firsthand knowledge of the operations of the business, 3 certainly EPS operates a very carefully regulated 4 operation. • 5 All of its equipment coming in, is 6 7 carefully tagged and identified. There's an 8 elaborate computer system that identifies the

It also engages in an elaborate selfimplementing decontamination procedure. It has a
furnace.

JUDGE FULTON: A lot of those things would probably need to be done anyway, though, right? Are you suggesting that these are activities that are not undertaken at a facility like G&S?

MS. HWANG: Your Honor, there's no regulatory oversight. We don't know whether G&S has complied with the burning requirements. They don't have manifests of any of their PCB waste going into the facility.

They are just not regulated under 761;

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

202-347-3700

equipment.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

410-684-2550

21

22

that's the tension. 1 JUDGE FULTON: The burning requirements would only apply, if G&S were regulated as a 3 commercial storage facility? Or is it because it's a 4 scrap metal furnace, would those requirements apply 5 in equal force there? 6 MS. HWANG: I will defer to counsel on 7 that, Your Honor. 8 9 JUDGE FULTON: Okay. I don't want to --10 MS. HWANG: JUDGE FULTON: One last question: 11 12 addition to just contending with a sort of challenging legal standard for selective prosecution, 13 we're in an appellate setting here. 14 You've had the opportunity to present this 15. case very fully below. Many witnesses have been 16 called and have testified, and we have an 17 Administrative Law Judge's decision that really turns 1.8 on his sense of the veracity of the witnesses that 19

This Board has repeatedly, over the years, observed that we would ordinarily defer to the

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

were heard on this issue.

conclusions of the trial judge on questions relating to the credibility of the witnesses or findings that derive from credibility assessments.

How would you suggest that we contend with that kind of legal dynamic in a case like this?

MS. HWANG: Two things, Your Honor:

First, the main issue that we have discussed this

morning before the EAB, relates to the body of

evidence in which G&S has been accepting PCB waste

for disposal.

And that was a large portion of EPS's case. That body of evidence, the contracts, even some of the information that had been provided by CID's investigator, John Dillon, none of that was addressed in the initial Order.

Secondly, Your Honor, if you review the testimony from the witnesses -- and I'm sure that in our briefs, and Mr. Kropp will be able to amplify on that -- the witnesses' testimony, in our view, is not credible.

There were inconsistencies, there were areas where witnesses admitted that they were not

knowledgeable about certain areas of the regulations and requirements. There are instances where regulatory standards such as when is PCB waste, for purposes of PCB disposal -- we have testimony from Region II, from Ann Finnegan, saying that it's not waste until it's actually tested, whereas EPA's own expert, John Smith, in his testimony, indicated that it's waste, regardless of when you test it.

So if you balance out the conflicting testimony between witnesses, and you take even EPA's own testimony from its expert, its own expert, vis a vis -- and compare that with Region II's own investigator, who was adopting the exemptions applying to G&S, you have to accept the fact that Mr. Smith's testimony, in our view, is more credible.

JUDGE FULTON: Okay, thank you, Ms. Hwang.

MS. HWANG: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Kropp, we had a few carryover questions for you.

One was this question of resale, whether EPS engages in any resale activity. What's your understanding of that?

MR. KROPP: EPS does not engage in any

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

1	resale activity, Your Honor, and to talk about the
2	economic disparity, I do know that in the early to
3	mid-'90s, when EPS discovered that it was losing its
4	customer base to G&S, it called some of its former
. 5	customers and said, why are you switching?
6	And the answer was, they pay us for the
7	transformers and you charge us to come get them.
8	JUDGE FULTON: And the reason that you
9	charge and that they pay, is?
10	MR. KROPP: The reason that we charge and
11	they pay, is because we use a hazardous waste
12	transporter; we fill out all the paperwork; we keep
13	all the documentation. They can get any trucking
14	company they want to, to put any unit on a
15	transformer carrier and bring it into their facility
16	and nobody knows what happens to it after that.
17	JUDGE FULTON: Is that primary rub, the
18	cost of transportation between the generating
19	facility and
20	MR. KROPP: That and the several hundred
21	thousand dollars worth of trust funds and
22	JUDGE FULTON: Setting aside that capital

1	that might otherwise be used?
2	MR. KROPP: Yes, and the activities and
3	documentation that must be undertaken. For example,
4	both of these companies have the same scrap metal
.5	furnace.
6	EPS is required to document all of its
7	burns, all of its days. That's why we're here, is
8	because they did keep those documents.
9	But our understanding is that if you go to
10	G&S and ask for that same documentation, they don't
11	have it.
12	JUDGE FULTON: Now, are they subject to
13	the same regulatory provision regarding temperature
14	maintenance during burns.
15 ,	MR. KROPP: Justice Fulton, as far as we
16	know, their furnace is the same kind of furnace; it's
17	a two-chamber furnace; it does the same thing that
18	EPS's does. It just
19	JUDGE FULTON: It's not subject to the
20	regulation, the EPA regulation at all?
21	MR. KROPP: I've never seen any
22	documentation from EPA saying they've inspected that

.5

furnace under 761.7(2)(a). I don't think that there's anything in the record.

JUDGE FULTON: Okay, thank you. You may proceed.

MR. KROPP: One of the other issues on Count One, is that the commercial storage definition applies to people who store PCB wastes generated by others, or that was removed from service and brokered for disposal.

That implies that if I own the piece of equipment and I happen to be a PCB commercial storer, my maximum storage capacities -- and in this case, we're talking about Count One of the Complaint alleging a violation of the maximum storage capacity, and putting aside what that limit is for a second, the fact that I have a piece of equipment in my PCB storage area, if it's owned by myself, the commercial maximum storage capacities don't apply.

If, on the other hand, it was generated by somebody else, or I was out servicing it and picked it up and brought it back to my facility for processing, then the MSCs do apply.

: 5

In both Count One and Count Two of this Complaint, the PCB inspectors, when they inspected the EPS facility, simply walked in the door, said, show me your facility. EPS did that, and they added up the number of boxes and added up the weights and said, boy, that's more than 5,000 pounds; you're in violation.

EPS's own witnesses, including Charlene

Kremer, who was the PCB Coordinator who initiated the inspections to begin with, testified on September 10th of 2003, that the regulations don't apply to equipment that is owned, agreed with that interpretation and agreed that if I don't know who owns the equipment, then I can't do an inventory, if there's commingled equipment in the facility.

And, at EPS, we've maintained all along that there was commingled equipment. In fact, the EPS contract, when it picks up equipment at any facility, says that EPS becomes the owner of the equipment upon taking possession.

So have a contract that says we're the owner. In addition, we do the testing of all the

equipment when it comes in the door. That's another part of the definition, and we have a letter of guidance from EPA Region II.

and their handling of G&S, sent them a letter and said, if I bring the equipment in the door and if I test it and make the determination that it's a waste, because now I know it's above 50 parts per million and can't be resold, who is the generator of the waste?

Region II sent a letter in September of 2000, and said that the person who does the testing and makes the determination, is the generator. If I'm the generator, again, the maximum storage capacities in the commercial storage approval, don't apply to that piece of equipment.

JUDGE WOLGAST: The Region has argued that the owner of the equipment is inconsistent with the President of EPS's testimony about the nature of the cradle-to-grave services provided by EPS, as well as the way the manifests were documented.

What record evidence would you point to,

to refute those allegations?

MR. KROPP: Well, the record is that EPS uses -- and, forgive me, Your Honor; there are 13,000 pages in the record, I think, or 14,000 and I don't have a page citation for you, and I'll be glad to get that for you -- but the record does talk about the fact that while EPS does use hazardous waste manifests, as required by 761.207, 8, 9 and 10, and G&S doesn't do that, by the way, that waste, once it's brought onsite, can be re-manifested.

It's another paperwork hassle, and EPS doesn't do that, but it could. So, while it is a cradle-to-grave effort, clearly, for equipment that is tested and found to be greater than 50 parts per million, it can't be resold. Obviously, that's cradle-to-grave.

And EPS could sell equipment that's under 50. It chooses not to do that.

JUDGE WOLGAST: What activities at EPS were the subject of the Company's desire to get an authorization as a commercial storer?

MR. KROPP: EPS elected to file the

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

notification as a commercial storer, out of an abundance of caution and in compliance with all the regulatory programs.

The testimony in trial is replete with testimony from EPA witnesses, multiple EPA witnesses, that a facility can have multiple roles. It can be a transport facility; it can be a commercial storer; it can be a disposer, and EPS, in the early '90s, when it made the initial decision to get the commercial storage approval, did so because it didn't know how its business was going to grow.

So, in an effort to comply with all of Part 761, it make the notification that it was a commercial storer.

JUDGE WOLGAST: So, on the days that are in question in this proceeding, what is EPS's position on whether or not they had activities that fell under the rubric of commercial storer?

MR. KROPP: EPS's position is that there may have been some of the equipment that was commercially stored; more importantly -- and when I began my argument, I talked about putting aside what

is the maximum storage capacity -- Part 761.65(g)(9) was promulgated on June 29th of 1998, under what's known as the PCB Mega-rule. That was the financial assurance mechanism.

trust fund, and it filed a closure plan. In July of 1999, EPS recognized that its trust fund had grown substantially since it first deposited it, and, therefore, the trust fund would cover disposal of significantly greater volumes of waste.

If you read 761.65(b)(9), it talks about when you modify the financial assurance plan, you notify the Administrator. EPS sent a notification to Region III in July of 1999. That notification said we have enough money in our trust fund now to cover 100,000 pounds of material.

The regulation nowhere uses the word,

"approval," although EPA, the Region's position is,

well, that has to be approved by the Region, for a

number of reasons. But the point is -- and this gets

into the fair warning argument that we have made

under the GE case -- EPA never responded to that July

1999 notification.

It did two inspections. It filed a Complaint, and the week before the hearing started in 2003, it sent a letter to EPS, saying, oh, by the way, we reject your 1999 notification.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But even assuming that a financial assurance requirement could alter the requirements for when someone does and doesn't have to have approval as a commercial storer, here, your authorization itself, that you obtained from Region III, I thought, specifically said that any modification required the approval of the Regional Administrator.

MR. KROPP: The question there is a matter of interpretation. There isn't a definition of what is a modification.

In this case, there was not any physical modification of the EPS facility at all. They designed the original facility sufficiently large enough to contain the amount of weight of materials for which they notified in July of 1999, so there was no physical change. There was simply just more stuff

there.

. 5

So our position is that the 761.65(g)(9) notification only required a notification. That financial assurance doesn't dictate whether you need a storage approval; it's the fact that we made the notification and we had the approval in-hand, but the limit in that was for 5,000 pounds.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But just to understand your argument, you're saying that as to the wording in the approval, any departure from the conditions of approval, wouldn't include a large increase in the amount of PCB waste stored at the facility?

MR. KROPP: Well, we read the regulation on its face, and it didn't say anything about approval; it says that when you change the financial assurance mechanism, you've got to notify the Regional Administrator, and that's what we did; that's what the regulation says.

JUDGE FULTON: But the regulation, even if it's ambiguous in terms of the approval process for this kind of change, does say rather unambiguously that the RA has the authority to include, quote, such

. 5

Administrator's view. Why should we not look at this condition, this requirement to seek written authorization, written into the authorization document itself, as just that, a condition that the Regional Administrator determined is necessary, and why doesn't that fill this gap?

MR. KROPP: Justice Fulton, I believe that it might, had EPA responded and said, well, wait a minute; you can't do that. We reserve the right and have the authority and we would concede that the regulation says that they have the authority to amend the conditions, but they didn't do that.

Moreover, after EPS notified EPA under 761.65(g)(9) of its intent to increase its MSC to 100,000 pounds, EPS requested approval to receive 98,000 of PCB waste from a site for a job it was doing.

EPA Region III initially denied the approval, pointing out the MSC in the 1998 storage approval. EPS then called Charlene Kremer -- and testimony is in the record -- and said, what about

21

22

the fact that we've notified you, we sent you a 1 notification, and we can receive up to 100,000 2 3 pounds? EPS heard nothing more from EPA, except 4 5 that its name suddenly appeared on an approved list for this 98,000 pounds. 6 7 Now, if I sent the notification in, I got nothing back, my next contact from EPA is, you can't 8 accept this 98,000 pounds of PCB waste because of 9 your MSC, and I call them up and say, hey, I notified 10 you and raised my limit to 100,000 pounds, I get 11 nothing back, other than my name appears on an 12 approved list, and that waste is allowed to come into 13 my facility, I think I have the right to believe that 14 my 1999 notification was acceptable and was accepted 15 by EPA. Didn't hear back from them until a week 16 17 before this trial started in 2003, to the contrary. 18 JUDGE WOLGAST: 19

Is the 98,000 pounds, the CRCLA waste?

> MR. KROPP: Yes, PCB waste.

JUDGE FULTON: And that's in the record. that documentation?

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

2

3

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

MR. KROPP: It is, Your Honor.

JUDGE STEIN: You mentioned that you take some of the waste -- that you accept, comes within the terms of this commercial storage approval, and you also have other kinds of waste.

What obligation, if any, does your company have to segregate those two categories of waste, in order to be able to prove that it's in compliance with the terms of its permit?

MR. KROPP: Justice Stein, the Company does keep documentation regarding every single piece of equipment that comes into the shop. Now, I'm not aware of any regulatory obligation that says we have to segregate it and we have to account for it.

However, we are absolutely able to do that, if an inspector walks in the door and says, tell me which one of these pieces of equipment you own, and tell me which one of these pieces are subject to your MSC? We could do that.

EPA inspectors, in this case, never asked the question; they never asked who owns the equipment, and they never asked whether any of the

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

410-684-2550

2

3

4

: 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

other exceptions to Part 761.65 applied.

JUDGE STEIN: But didn't they send you a written request that the Company then responded to, as to how many transformers and capacitors it had onsite?

MR. KROPP: They did send a written request and we did send -- and that's the key question, Your Honor -- they said, how many transformers do you have onsite? We answered and said we've got this many transformers onsite, but they didn't say, and are you the owner and were they -- were any of them decontaminated under 761.79 self-implementing decontamination processes, for which a commercial storage approval is not required; they never asked those questions.

JUDGE FULTON: So you contend, then, that with respect to so-called PCB transformers, those that contain PCBs over 500 parts per million, that some of those transformers on the site, are owned by EPS?

MR. KROPP: I do, Your Honor. The contract says that they are.

. 5

JUDGE FULTON: But these are contracts that also have a manifest arrangement where the generator -- you're disassociating the idea of generation from the idea of ownership. Is that what you need to do in order to draw that conclusion?

MR. KROPP: I think that the manifest and the question of who signs as the generator, is signed by the generator, out of an abundance of caution, because there's no longer any requirement -- never was a requirement -- to test materials, equipment, before you shipped it.

However, with the passage of the Megarule, what was formerly known as the Assumption Rule, which meant that you could handle a piece of equipment as it if was less than 50, until you knew differently. You could handle it as if it were unregulated.

That Assumption Rule was deleted in the Mega-rule in 1998, so, now while there is no obligation to test the equipment, as Dr. Smith so eloquently put it in his testimony, it is what it is.

If it's above 50 and you handle it, and

you transport it, once you get it to its destination and test it, and, at that point, discover it's greater than 50, it's the same as having had a speeding violation. That waste, that piece of equipment, should have, under 761.207, been required to be transported using a hazardous waste manifest.

So, out of an abundance of caution, in this scheme, we transport all pieces of equipment, because it's untested, as is if it is PCB-contaminated equipment, have the owner at the time, until we pick it up, sign as the generator, in case it turns out that when we test it, it's regulated and needed to be transported under a hazardous waste manifest.

We could, at the time we make that decision, either re-manifest it. For example, if it's greater than 500 and we're transporting it for disposal, we could and have the option, and Ms.

Kremer testified on September 10th of 03, that that, indeed, could be done, it could be re-manifested, if we chose to do that, to ship that greater-than-500 unit off for disposal at another location.

. 5

JUDGE WOLGAST: Could I ask just a point of clarification? Putting aside the ownership issue for a second, when you sent EPA the list of transformers in the diked area on the facility on certain dates alleged in Count One and Count Two, what do you purport that that list represented?

MR. KROPP: In the list for Count One -- I don't recall the list being sent for Count Two, because Count Two only involves one bank of capacitors, but the list for Count One, we answered exactly the question that EPA asked us. EPA said, give us a list of the transformers that were in -- and the weights -- that were in your storage area on the date of the first inspection.

JUDGE WOLGAST: The PCB transformers?

MR. KROPP: I believe -- and I'm not clear, Your Honor. I don't know whether it was only PCB transformers or whether they simply said, give us a list of the transformers.

But the important issue is that they didn't ask the ultimate disposition, and they didn't ask who owns those transformers, as they sit there.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Well, going back to your argument that different activities -- I mean, you're arguing that different activities can fall under different regulatory regimes.

MR. KROPP: That's correct.

JUDGE FULTON: As opposed to there is one overarching umbrella of what, generically, does this company do, so what regulatory provision does it fall into?

MR. KROPP: Correct, Your Honor. And that's supported by EPA witness testimony.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But now back to the transformers in the diked area, regardless of what subsequently happens, if it's decontaminated and put in the scrap oven, at that time, could the transformers in the diked area, if they're PCB transformers, not be subject to commercial storage requirements?

MR. KROPP: Absolutely, that's our point.

If we own that piece of equipment, then the

definition of commercial storer does not apply to

that piece of equipment. It's our equipment.

JUDGE WOLGAST: But that's premised on 1 2 your ownership argument. I'm saying, putting that 3 aside for a moment --4 MR. KROPP: Okay. 5 JUDGE WOLGAST: The transformers in the 6 diked area, you're not -- I mean, I'm trying to draw 7 the distinction between the transformers, as they sit there, and their ultimate disposition, which may be 8 9 that they are decontaminated as they go to the scrap 10 oven, but as they sit there in the diked area, as the 11 inspector saw them? 12 MR. KROPP: Our position is that in order to do an accurate inventory of that equipment, they 13 14 would need to have asked EPS, are you going to decontaminate this transformer under the 761.79? 15 16 And they knew of the existence of 761.79. 17 Their inspection report says, EPS is using the new 18 self-implementing decontamination. 19 They didn't ask that question, but, yes, 20 that exemption absolutely ought to apply as that unit 21 is sitting waiting to be decontaminated.

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

But why, if it's not

JUDGE WOLGAST:

22

2

3

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

presently decontaminated? I mean, I understand your point, you know, as to the activity, the subsequent activity --MR. KROPP: Sure. JUDGE WOLGAST: -- but now, just focusing on, as they sit there in storage, some of which for over two months, as I understand it --MR. KROPP: Sure, but you can store that kind of equipment under the regulations, for up to a year, and you will note, even in the record, there was nothing that was stored there more than three months. EPS operates on a continuous basis. burn multiple burns per day in their scrap metal recovery oven, and equipment comes in all the time, 24 hours a day. They don't -- at that time, they weren't running a midnight shift in all cases, but

they could have, but the equipment comes in the door all the time.

It is stored in the storage area, and then as the workers come in and do their processing, it's removed from the storage area, so that on any given

. 5

day, as you look at the storage area, some of the equipment is owned by EPS, some of it is going to be decontaminated under 761.79, and some of it, as it turns out to be greater-than-500-PCB equipment, would be processed for transportation for disposal.

At the time, EPS couldn't dispose of greater-than-500 parts-per-million equipment and so it would repackage stuff, and so the 761.20 exemption applied there, and that's what we argue applies to the capacitors in Count Two.

JUDGE WOLGAST: What categories of transformers do you own?

MR. KROPP: We can own anything. Anything that comes in the door, we could own. Our contract says that no matter what it is, at the time we pick it up in the field and it's not been tested, but we pick it up, the contract says we become the owner at that point.

We do the testing when it comes in the door. And if you look at the September 12th 2000 letter from Region II, in which Region II says that Headquarters and Region III concurred in, if we own

it and we test it and we make the decision as to the 1 ultimate disposition, then we are the generator. 2 3 JUDGE FULTON: So you don't commercially store anything, then? 4 It's -- we can make an :5 MR. KROPP: argument, yes, that we do not need a commercial 6 7 storage approval at all, and that we do not commercially store any piece of equipment. 8 JUDGE FULTON: Have you sought acceptance 9 of that view from Region III? 10 MR. KROPP: I think that's why we're here, 11 Your Honor. 12 JUDGE FULTON: Well, I don't think that's 13 actually why we're here. Have you challenged your 14 regulatory status with Region III? I understand that 15 you're challenging G&S's regulatory status, but what 16 -- if your view is that you really don't need a 17 commercial storage authorization at all, then how has 18 that view been advanced with the Region? 19 20 MR. KROPP: I think the question is that we have chosen not to challenge that, because of the 21 22 fear of then expense of this kind of litigation.

mean, we've been at this for four years, and, you know, a half million to a million dollars worth of legal fees, and EPS can operate, using the commercial storage approval.

It had already, the commercial storage approval, so there's no reason to say, okay, we want our trust fund money back and we don't want the commercial storage approval.

We have just gone ahead and said, okay, we recognize that here are the rules that we play by, and we're going to continue to do business that way.

It's in the best interest of us and our customers.

JUDGE FULTON: This ownership theory of yours, just to make sure that I understand how it works in this particular scenario, had the Region III inspectors asked, they would have been told that all of the PCB transformers in the area that they inspected, were owned by EPS and where, therefore, not subject to the commercial storage requirements.

MR. KROPP: I can't make that statement,
Your Honor. What I can say is that, yes, it's
possible that they could have been told that.

2

3

4

: 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

And I don't know the circumstances of all of the units that were in the storage area on that They could have also been told, we own these, but these, we don't own. But the Company had that documentation and was never asked for it.

JUDGE FULTON: Basically, the contracts undergirded each of these contracts.

> MR. KROPP: Sure.

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't it reasonable to expect that in response to EPA's letter, which was clearly designed to determine whether or not the Company was in compliance with the terms of its permit, that if the Company felt that they owned all or some portion of these transformers, that that information would have been set forth in the letter? Why isn't it reasonable for EPA to assume that that would have been spelled out, if that was the Company's --

MR. KROPP: Your Honor, this is the first enforcement action that this Company has had in its history. There have been some letters that have gone back and forth, but even when EPA did its

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

800-336-6646

Nationwide Coverage

410-684-2550

. 5

inspections, it didn't do any kind of a debriefing and say, you know, we think we've got a problem with this.

I apologize, but my client advises that the record does indicate which equipment was in commercial storage, so, apparently, some of it was and some of it was not. I apologize for the misstatement.

JUDGE WOLGAST: I wanted to understand, and just to follow up on your argument about decontaminated materials and going back to 40 CFR 761.20, which basically prohibits the processing and distribution in commerce, of PCBs, unless they fall under certain exemptions --

MR. KROPP: Yes.

JUDGE WOLGAST: -- one of which is (5),
Decontaminated Materials.

So, just to understand your argument, as I hear you, you're saying that if the inspector had asked and had been told that certain transformers were destined for decontamination, and further in the scrap metal oven, that as to those transformers, they

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

would then fall under Subsection (5) and would not be
the basis of a commercial storage requirement?

MR. KROPP: That's our argument, Your

Honor, on Count One.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Right.

MR. KROPP: On Count Two, it's

761.20(c)(2)(i).

JUDGE WOLGAST: Right.

MR. KROPP: And, in that instance, those capacitors were shipped from a company called AEP, and they were assumed not to be PCB capacitors. Once they arrived, they were tested and found to be greater than 500. They were pure PCB capacitors, and they had to be physically dismantled, and in this case, in the initial decision, Keith Reed, the President, talked about the amount of labor and the time that was done, and in the initial decision, the tribunal below simply said, well, the capacitors were there for the maximum ten days allowed under that exemption, and it doesn't matter, because EPS clearly intended to store them when they got them.

Well, there's no intent requirement set

2

3

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

forth in that exemption. If you have it there less than ten days, you're not subject to the commercial storage approval requirements.

And, in this case, those capacitors arrived, and, ten days later, were shipped off for disposal. Accordingly, we don't believe they should be subject to the MSCs in that permit.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And who do you contend has the burden of proof on Count One and Count Two, to prove that you fall within these exemptions or not?

MR. KROPP: I think that EPA has the burden of proving that a piece of equipment falls within the maximum storage capacity. And they could have done that.

it was never provided an opportunity to give that documentation for those counts under these exemptions.

I'm being told I need to wrap up, so I'll just -- if I might only say, regarding Count Three, we don't believe that the record substantiates any of the data that was used, and, in fact, if you read the

September 10th cross examination of EPA witness Scott Rice, you will see that the laboratory data that EPA used --

First of all, they had no verifiable data when they brought the Complaint. During the course of the hearing, they subpoensed the laboratory and got data that they thought was accurate data, and that represented the lab results.

It didn't. They thought they had EPS bar codes. They didn't have EPS bar codes that identify each piece of equipment, and yet the penalty and all of the initial decision is predicated on the fact that that ATCI lab data was accurate data, and we believe the record supports a conclusion that that is not the case.

In closing, I will just say that we would request that the initial decision be reversed on all counts, or if you find that EPA's interpretation of the regulations is permissible, that the penalty be stricken, because of the lack of fair notice and fair warning under the GE Doctrine. Thank you.

JUDGE FULTON: Thank you, Mr. Kropp. Ms.

. 5

Jamieson?

MS. JAMIESON: Good morning, Your Honors and counsel for Appellant. I'm Cheryl Jamieson of Region III, and I'd like to present an overview of Region III's case, and then discuss several important issues.

First of all, the initial decision holds that Appellant violated two types of PCB requirements: One is violations of the commercial storage approval by storing too much PCB waste, and the second is the failure to adhere to the scrap metal oven recovery time and temperature requirements under 761.72(a)(3), by burning PCB-contaminated electrical equipment, too short of a time.

That is what the case came down to in three Counts. As alleged by the Region in Counts One and Two, the storage of the PCB electrical equipment exceeded the limits in its TSCA storage approval, which was issued by the Regional Administrator in 1998.

If you commercially store for disposal, over 500 gallons or more of PCB waste, you are

. 5

subject to the approval authority of the EPA Regional Administrators.

In this case, that is what the Appellant's business engages in. The quantity of PCB waste equipment and oil that can be stored -- the storage limitations are important, because the quantity of waste that can be stored, is directly linked to the closure plan and the financial assurance that the company has to provide.

The financial assurance being adequate, would prevent the abandonment of PCB waste and the cleanups that might be necessitated to be paid for by taxpayers.

As alleged in Count Three, Appellant operates a scrap metal recovery oven to burn PCB-contaminated electrical equipment; that is, items from 50 to 499 parts per million of PCB.

The inspectors went to the facility and reviewed only what I am going to term a snapshot of Appellant's oven operating data for three random weeks selected in 1999.

That evidence showed that the Appellant

2

3

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

failed to meet the regulatory time and temperature standards when burning the PCB-contaminated electrical equipment on 16 occasions during those three weeks.

Why is that time and temperature requirement standard important under 72(a)(3)? It's important because the time and temperature standard is what ensures the adequate decontamination of the scrap metal before it's sent out into commerce for recycling.

And as Dr. John Smith testified, from the Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances and the Presiding Officer quoted with approval, "The Regulation assures PCBs on metal surfaces are sufficiently volatilized in the primary chamber."

Even though there may be small amounts on the metal surfaces to start, if the temperatures are insufficient to volatilize and destroy the PCBs, there may be products of incomplete combustion on those surfaces, going out into interstate commerce, which persons can be exposed to.

As to all three Counts in our Complaint,

2

3

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

there's ample evidence in the record fully supporting the Presiding Officer's findings. In addition, as noted by the Appellant, they brought a selective enforcement defense. The Presiding Officer also found that the Appellant failed to meet that high burden to sustain that defense. Now, I'd like to discuss some of the issues raised on our prima facie case for Counts One, Two, and perhaps Three. JUDGE WOLGAST: Could you begin by describing what you believe has to be included in the Government's Count One prima facie case? MS. JAMIESON: Yes.

JUDGE FULTON: At some point, I'd like to hear your explanation of why a request for a change in the financial assurance mechanism, necessarily raised a concern in Region III's mind about the quantity of waste being stored.

> MS. JAMIESON: Yes.

In regard to our prima facie case, what we had to prove, was that Respondent was subject to the

TSCA commercial storage approval at the time we conducted the inspections; that there were PCB transformers in storage at that time; and that the weights of those PCB transformers exceeded their commercial storage limitation of 5,000 pounds.

The transcript will show, at Volume I, at page 240 to 251, that Inspector McPhilliamy entered the facility with Inspector Rice, attempted to make a count of the crowded PCB transformers that were in storage, and did make a count which was slightly off the list that was then provided to the Agency by the Appellant, when, at the completion of the inspection, the inspectors asked for a list of PCB transformers in storage.

And you will see that in the transcript, at the section that I highlighted. I'd also like to show the response to the November inspection.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Just to clarify what you just said, what you were -- what the inspectors believe that they were asking for, was PCB transformers.

MS. JAMIESON: Yes.

1	JUDGE WOLGAST: If, in fact, the list
2	contained both PCB transformers, that is,
3	transformers that contained over 500 PPM of PCB, as
4	well as PCB-contaminated transformers, that,
: 5	presumably, wouldn't be helpful in establishing your
6	excedance of the pound limit, would it?
7	MS. JAMIESON: No, it would not. But I'd
8	like to show you two of the exhibits that were
9	supplied to us, that show that the concentrations of
10	the items in storage, units in storage, were grater
11	than 500 parts per million, if I may.
12	Here is the response to can you hear me
13	without the microphone?
14	JUDGE WOLGAST: Yes.
15,	MS. JAMIESON: Here is the response to
16	Inspector McPhilliamy's November request, dated on
17	the date of the inspection, given contemporaneously
18	with the inspection.
19	PCB units in storage, 11/22/1999. It was
20	actually faxed, I believe, to our office.
21	Here is the list of the items in storage.
22	Transformers are designated by T for transformer on

the item list; or PAD for pad-mounted transformer, or 1 2 POLE for pole-mounted transformer. JUDGE FULTON: If you could just swing 3 your mike around in your direction? 4 MS. JAMIESON: . 5 Sorry. JUDGE FULTON: That way, the Court 6 7 Reporter will be able to hear you. MS. JAMIESON: Sorry. Shall I repeat 8 that? 9 You will see items listed as Transformers, 1.0 with a T; PADS for pad-mounted transformers; POLES 11 for pole-mounted transformers. 12 You will then see a bar code, which is 13 part of the Appellant's system for identifying 14 materials that he receives for disposal, the cradle-15 16 to-grave system that he engages in and tells his 17 customers that he engages in. You will then see receipt date, then RFS 18 19 What does that indicate? The date the 20 transformer was removed from storage, the manifest 21 number upon which the item was received from the 22 generator, to the commercial storer, in this case,

EPS, and then you see PPM level, parts per million. 1 You will see that the starred items are 2 the items in the Complaint. I have more lists, but I 3 think this sufficiently illustrates the PCB 4 concentrations, in all instances being over 500 parts - 5 per million. 6 JUDGE FULTON: For the November 2nd 7 inspection? 8 MS. JAMIESON: For the November. 9 JUDGE FULTON: What about the July 10 inspection? 11 JUDGE WOLGAST: I'm sorry, before we leave 12 this, what's that exhibit number? 13 14 MS. JAMIESON: That is Exhibit 12, CX-12, 15 Your Honor. 16 In regard to the July inspection, a 17 similar situation took place. The inspectors went in, they asked to see the PCB transformers in 18 storage. That is in the transcript, and their 19 20 credibility was upheld by the Presiding Officer. 21 They were given a list. In this case, PCB 22 unit weights, July 15, 1999, and the bar code numbers

indicating Respondent's cradle-to-grave disposal 1 system, and the weights of the transformers. 2 In regard to the concentrations --3 (Pause.) 4 I'm sorry, Your Honor, I misplaced one of 5 my exhibits. 6 (Pause.) 7 This is a picture, a photograph taken by 8 Scott McPhilliamy on July 15, 1999, of the area that 9 10 they were taken to when they asked to see PCB transformers in storage. You will note the yellow 11 labels are the designations PCB transformers -- are 12 13 transformers, that is, over 500 parts per million. JUDGE FULTON: How many do you see in the 14 photograph? Or how many can be discerned from the 15 16 photograph? 17 MS. JAMIESON: They are difficult to be 18 discerned, because of the way they're being stored. 19 The Inspectors counted approximately 32 when they 20 went through, but there were actually 36, so they

JUDGE FULTON: Did the units, the PCB

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

were close in their count.

21

22

1	units, in the reference in the list by that name, PCB
2	units, weights must we view this list as being
3	limited to the transformers, or could this pertain to
4	other PCB articles in that storage area?
• 5	MS. JAMIESON: I believe you should view
6	the list as being limited to PCB transformers,
7	because that is the testimony of the inspectors in
8	the record.
9	JUDGE FULTON: Because that's what was
10	requested?
11	MS. JAMIESON: It's what was requested;
12	that is what was viewed; that was what the list was
13	provided for, although it's not as descriptive as the
14	November list.
15,	In addition to the evidence that we're
16	putting forward, this Appellant applied to be a
17	commercial storer of PCB waste, in CX-1. He then
1.8	told the Agency he wanted 5,000 pounds maximum
19	storage for those transformers. He was given that
20	amount.
21	He got the approval in CX-2, with the
22	amount, and the bar codes that you see listed in

22

covers?

1	July, indicate that cradie-to-grave disposal system
2	that he engages in, receiving waste, on manifests,
3	from generators, to commercially store such waste for
4	disposal.
5	JUDGE WOLGAST: On the testimony of the
6	inspector about the request for the number and
7	weights of PCB transformers, was that an oral
8	request, or was that ever reduced to writing?
9	MS. JAMIESON: Those requests were oral,
10	and they were made at the inspections, and the
11	material lists were faxed, I believe, faxed to the
12	Wheeling office.
13	JUDGE WOLGAST: And when EPA received the
14	bar code numbers and the corresponding list of
15	weights, at that time or at any subsequent time, was
16	there a request to clarify PCB concentrations of
17	those units?
18	MS. JAMIESON: The concentrations were
19	given in the November list, so there was no question
20	to clarify them. And the labels
21	JUDGE WOLGAST: But the November list

1	MS. JAMIESON: One of the storage
2	violations in Count One.
3	JUDGE WOLGAST: Right. But I'm talking
4	about July.
. 5	MS. JAMIESON: The July list, the
6	inspectors did not the issues was not raised with
7	them and they did not request to say who owned them.
8	They had no reason to believe that these items were
9	not shipped to EPS by the generators. That is the
10	business that Appellant is engaged in, and the
11	Presiding Officer found that to be reasonable.
12	JUDGE WOLGAST: But just to understand,
13	you're saying that they never requested
14	concentrations of the units.
15,	MS. JAMIESON: In July.
16	JUDGE WOLGAST: In July.
17	MS. JAMIESON: That is correct.
18	JUDGE WOLGAST: Or as to the units in
19	question in July, at any time; at no time did they
20	ask for those?
21	MS. JAMIESON: At no time.
22	JUDGE FULTON: Although your position is

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage

ĸ

1	
2	
3	
4)
. 5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	

20

21

22

that the request was framed as a request for information regarding PCB transformers.

MS. JAMIESON: Yes.

JUDGE FULTON: Which, by definition, would be over 500 parts per million?

MS. JAMIESON: Yes, that is correct, and that is the information we believe we received, the Agency believed it received.

JUDGE FULTON: What do you think of this ownership theory that Mr. Kropp was talking about earlier? Had Inspector McPhilliamy, had he asked about ownership, he might very well have been told that a substantial proportion of these transformers, were owned by EPS. What do you make of that?

MS. JAMIESON: I don't accept that the ownership is the designation for deciding who the generator is. It's not the dispositive decision on who the generator is.

The generator is defined as those who -person whose act or process produces PCBs regulated
for disposal under Subpart (d) of this Part, or first
causes PCBs or items to be subject to the disposal

- 5

requirement of Subpart (d), which is Storage and
Disposal, or who has physical control over the PCBs
when a decision is made that the use of the PCBs has
been terminated, and, therefore, subject to disposal.

And you will find in the record, testimony by Respondent's President, that his cradle-to-grave system is that his customers are generators, primarily electrical utility companies who generate the waste that Respondent then is paid to dispose of, and engages in commercial storage to dispose at his facility, or, in the case of transformers, may be engaging in other activities with them, such as the claim of decontamination under 79(c), or sending the items to safety clean for disposal, because the scrap metal oven cannot accommodate items from 500 parts per million or over.

JUDGE FULTON: Does the idea of ownership have importance outside the related concept of generator, or do generator and owner go hand-in-hand here under these regulations?

MS. JAMIESON: I believe that the generator, since it's the person who first -- I don't

1	believe ende end owner debignation applies here.
2	mean, am I not understanding?
3	JUDGE FULTON: Because the owner is the
4	generator, is what you're saying?
. 5	MS. JAMIESON: In this case, the owner
6	the person who first made the decision to dispose of
7	it, was the generator, and, if you will, call, under
8	lay person's terms, the owner, when he made that
9	decision.
10	JUDGE FULTON: So that leaves an
11	enterprise like EPS, as being something other than
12	that, at least, in your view?
13	MS. JAMIESON: In our view, they are the
14	commercial storer, as they applied to be, and are
15	permitted to be.
16	JUDGE STEIN: Do the regulations anywhere
17	define the term, "ownership," or "owner"?
18	(Pause.)
19	MS. JAMIESON: Not to my knowledge, but
20	I'm viewing 761.3.
21	JUDGE STEIN: Are you familiar, in your
22	experience as a Region III enforcement attorney, with

1.

anyone else who has asserted that they are unregulated by virtue of this ownership exemption, or is this the first time, to your knowledge, you've encountered this?

MS. JAMIESON: This is the first case in which I've encountered it. It's come up, as well, when we get to selective prosecution with G&S. It may come up again.

JUDGE STEIN: Is there any guidance that you're aware of, that's been issued as to what "ownership" means?

MS. JAMIESON: Not --

JUDGE STEIN: It is a little odd that you're relying on the generator definition to prove a regulatory term that says "ownership." One would think that -- I'm not saying that you can't make the connections that you're making, but if it's such a fundamental term in the regulations, one would think that there might be a definition somewhere, some kind of statement by the Agency, and guidance as to what that term means.

MS. JAMIESON: I'm not aware of that, Your

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

1	Honor, that there is a guidance.
2	JUDGE STEIN: Well, following the
3	argument, I would appreciate it if the Agency could
4	look at that issue, and if they find anything on
5	point, to please tell us about it.
6	MS. JAMIESON: I'd be happy to submit a
7	brief on it, Your Honor, if I find that I've missed
8	it somehow.
9	In regard to Count Two, I'd like to move
10	on to the capacitors and our prima facie case for
11	those. Here, Appellant is arguing that they were -
12	again, they're not a commercial storer for this
13	waste; once again, they are other than that.
14	In this case, they're a transfer facility
15	with regard to that waste, or they're processing it
16	under 20(c) with regard to that waste, but they're
17	not commercially storing.
18	That is not what the evidence in the
19	record shows.
20	(Pause.)
21	JUDGE STEIN: Which exhibit is this that
22	you're putting up?

. 5

MS. JAMIESON: I'd like to present Exhibit
CX-10. CX-10 is a manifest which shows that
capacitors that EPS had onsite on July excuse me -
- they were removed from service on June 23, 1999,
and received by the Respondent sometime shortly
thereafter.

This shows 26,000 pounds of PCB equipment, in this case, capacitors, were being stored by the Appellant on the date sometime after June 23rd, 1999, when the generator removed them from service.

In this case, the record evidence will show Respondent Exhibit 515, which is the incoming manifest, which I don't have in front of me, but which is in your record, which shows the generator was American Electric Power, and the destination facility was Environmental Protection Services.

The evidence of testimony will show that when the capacitors were received at the facility, they were broken down to be disposed of in Respondent's scrap metal oven.

At some point in time during this date from the incoming manifest to the outgoing manifest,

. 5

someone determined that perhaps they should be tested.

Samples were taken of the capacitors, sent out for sampling results, and it was found that the PCB concentrations were 500,000 parts per million.

At that point, the Appellant then consolidated or put together the equipment for offsite disposal, because it could not be burned in the scrap metal oven.

What the Region argued and the Judge held, is that they were not operating as a transfer facility in regards to the capacitors, because, under 761.3 and 761.65(d)(f), one who is transferring, must hold the waste during the normal course of transportation.

The tearing down of a huge bank of capacitors to dispose, the sampling of those, and then the subsequent activities in sending them off, did not indicate that Respondent was holding these items in the normal course of transportation.

Similarly, in regard to the processing exemption that Appellant advances, they were being

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1	processed, apparently, during a one-day time period,
2	if you agree that they were being processed. They
3	were being torn down during a one-day time period of
4	eight to nine hours, when they were actually onsite
: 5	11 days.
6	We contend that the processing and tearing
7	down was to facilitate disposal, and not to
8	facilitate transportation, because that is what the
9	testimony shows.

This is important, because it's the Region's position that one day of processing, does not give the Appellant the right to store indefinitely in violation of its storage approval.

JUDGE FULTON: Well, this really sort of - "indefinitely" is sort of a big-sounding word for
the period of time we're talking about here.

MS. JAMIESON: Well, he would be limited to a year. You are correct, he would be limited to a year.

JUDGE FULTON: But in this particular circumstance, he only had the material on hand for ten or 11 days, right?

. 5

MS. JAMIESON: Yes, but the definition keys on, they must be held during the normal course of transportation.

JUDGE FULTON: That's the transfer facility argument, okay. What about the processing for disposal exemption?

MS. JAMIESON: We contend that the processing under 20(c)(2)(i) does not apply to this activity that he engaged in -- excuse me, that Appellant engaged in, because the tearing down of capacitors -- and the Judge found this to be so -- was to facilitate disposal in the scrap metal oven and not to facilitate transportation.

JUDGE FULTON: Okay. You make a statement in your brief at page 43, that reads: "The processing for disposal exemption is designed for facilities that do not otherwise require a TSCA commercial storage approval, and not for persons who are operating commercial storage facilities under a TSCA storage approval."

MS. JAMIESON: Because storage, if you will, storage and processing are two distinct

.5

activities, so that the processing exemption only applies to the processing itself; it doesn't apply to engaging in the storage activity.

JUDGE FULTON: I understand, but I would assume that some period of storage is inevitably part of processing. I mean, you have the material while you're processing it, and I guess that's storage during processing, right?

MS. JAMIESON: In this particular case, they're storing -- they have a limit, a permit limit in place for the storage of such items, of 1,000 pounds. Here, we have 26,000 pounds.

JUDGE FULTON: But that assumes that they're operating under the authorization. Their argument is that for this particular transaction, they were operating outside their authorization; they really weren't -- they were entitled to regulatory exception here.

And your statement in your brief comes awfully close to suggesting that if you are a commercial storage facility, you really are not able to undertake activities outside the realm of

. 5

commercial storage, without those being swept into the storage process, as well.

MS. JAMIESON: Our position is that transfer -- this Appellant could act -- we conceded in the case and in our brief, that Appellant could act as a transfer facility, with respect to certain materials.

JUDGE FULTON: What about as a processing facility, as a facility that processes materials for disposal?

MS. JAMIESON: If that were truly what they were engaging in, then I would have to state that they probably could function as a processor, but, in this case, that's not the activities they were engaging in.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Let me see if I understand that argument. I had understood from what you said earlier, that you didn't believe, or it was EPA's position that 761.20(c)(i) processing activities exemption, didn't apply because it wasn't associated with -- because those processing activities, if they were processing activities, the

breaking down of the capacitors, weren't associated with and facilitating storage or transportation, that, instead, they were associated with and facilitated disposal in the scrap metal oven.

MS. JAMIESON: That was one of our arguments. We also looked at the examples of processing, in the preamble, and we stated that we did -- that the Agency looked at the examples of processing in the preamble, and did not equate the activities that the Appellant was engaged in, with those examples in the preamble.

JUDGE STEIN: I was hoping that before you conclude, you could address both Judge Fulton's earlier question about the purpose for the inspection, and, if I've missed it, pardon me, but also the selective prosecution issue.

MS. JAMIESON: Yes.

JUDGE STEIN: Whether or not this technically fits within the bounds of selective prosecution, which I think we all know, is a fairly difficult hurdle, I nonetheless find myself troubled that we're here talking in great detail about the

2.0

extent to which a company that has sought a permit and attempted to comply with the permit, whether on any particular given day, they, in fact, complied, in toto, with their permit, whereas we have information -- obviously a case not before us -- about a somewhat similarly-situated company, perhaps not identical -- we don't have that record fully before us -- which, if we're to believe what we're being told, is completely outside the system.

And whether or not that rises to the level of selective prosecution, I'm not sure, but it is nonetheless troubling, and I'd like to hear what the Region has to say about that.

MS. JAMIESON: What Region II found in regard to G&S, as an entity, a business entity, is not what the Appellant is representing. And you will find in the record, that these are two distinct business models.

While we did not have G&S in front of us, it's true, as a party to the litigation, there was evidence in the record that was put on by Region II, who were witnesses, who were found to be highly

T	credible by the ALO, Ann Finnegan and her supervisor,
2	Dan Kraft, that G&S, although a commercial storer,
3	does not require an approval, because it's limited to
4	the storage of 500 gallons of liquid or non-liquid of
5	PCBs at regulated levels at any time.
6	That's in the transcript at Volume XII at
7	144.
8	JUDGE FULTON: Does that mean that
9.	MS. JAMIESON: Also, in the definition of
10	the commercial storer at 761.3, you will find the
. 11	limitation in that definition, which I thought was an
12	odd place to put it, but it's there.
13	JUDGE FULTON: So, is the in Region
14	II's view, as you understand it and as represented in
15,	the proceeding below, G&S is a commercial storer,
16	albeit a de minimis one?
17	MS. JAMIESON: That is my understanding.
18	And then there were the activities in which they're
19	engaging in, have a difference from the very obvious
20	activities that the Appellant is engaging in.
21	For example, Region II found that G&S
22	purchases surplus lots of equipment, and they are

. 5

sent to the facility on a bill of lading, and the decision on whether or not to dispose or service such equipment, is made after the purchase.

In fact, G&S, the testimony, I believe, states, G&S purchases the surplus equipment. That is not the case with the Appellant today.

In contrast, EPS applied to Region III to be a commercial storer of PCB waste at quantities far greater than 500 gallons. In fact, PCB transformers and capacitors are only two of the types of material that the Appellant in engages in storing in.

It's a commercial storage approval. They were the ones in violation. But there's oil, there's contaminated electrical equipment, there's standards for at least eight to ten different types of electrical equipment representing thousands of pounds.

The record is clear that the equipment was waste before it arrives at EPS. How is that clear?

Well, if you look at CBI Exhibit 64, which I'm not going to speak to in detail, but just reference the exhibit, you will find manifests and

19

20

21

22

certificates of disposal from generators of all 1 types, and the certificates of disposal are issued by 2 the Appellant. 3 In addition, on the manifests, EPS is 4 listed as a destination facility. . 5 And I would like to go back to one point 6 in regard to the transfer. EPS was never listed as a 7 transporter on the manifest when it came in, only as 8 a destination facility. 9 There are two lines for transporters, and 10 EPS was not listed as a transporter, if it was, 11 indeed, really transferring the material or intending 12 It did not list itself as a transporter, rather, 13 as a destination facility. 14 15 back to the selective prosecution issue. 16 MS. JAMIESON: 17 Right.

JUDGE STEIN: I want to continue to go

I find myself very troubled JUDGE STEIN: It may well be that there are logical by this. explanations for why one company is regulated and one company is not.

Obviously, that's in the record and we can

-5

take a look at that. There's also some evidence that Region V has a somewhat different view.

Perhaps you could address this, but the notion that we have potentially three different regions doing potentially three different things, is of great concern, and it may be that what we're asked to resolve here, is selective prosecution.

But there are plenty of court cases out there of the Agency doing different things to different people, and it continues to trouble me a great deal.

MS. JAMIESON: I understand, Your Honor, but let's look at the record. First of all, G&S was not left untouched.

G&S was the subject of four or five civil inspections between 1998 and 2003, and also the subject of a criminal investigation by Region II's Criminal Investigation Division.

The Region's position is that that's not leaving a facility untouched. In addition, G&S was issued a Complaint, which is also in the record, by Region II, for two different types of violations,

2

3

4

:5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

which I don't have in my memory at this time, but I would be happy to brief and find them in the record for you afterwards.

Based -- Region V came into -- why did
Region V come into Region II's facility in the first
place? That's highly unusual.

Why? Because Appellant went to Region

II's high-level officials and made accusations

against a PCB inspector, that that person was

accepting favors from G&S Technologies, without any

evidence -- cancelled checks, videotapes,

documentation, testimony of any other person.

The allegations were made. That person was removed from the case, so Region II could investigate that allegation. And in order to see whether or not Region II was correct in its analysis, they invited Region V into their region to do an inspection of the same facility.

Region V raised several issues, and one of them is, aren't they really a commercial storer that requires an approval, as you are troubled by. And the Region described the activities and the operation

1	that they found G&S to be engaged in, went to
2	Headquarters to seek guidance, and received guidance
3	that G&S was operating within the commercial storage
4	realm, but did not require an approval.
.5	JUDGE FULTON: What document is that?
6	Where do we find the Headquarters affirmation
7	MS. JAMIESON: You will find
8	JUDGE FULTON: of Region II's response
9	to the Region V inspection?
10	MS. JAMIESON: There's testimony in the
11	record by Ann Finnegan, that will describe the entire
12	scenario, and I'm not certain at this exact moment,
13	whether or not there was a series of e-mails
14	recording this conversation which took place or this
15,	dialogue which took place between Region II and
16	Headquarters.
17	I'm not sure if that's documented. I can
18	find that out and point it out to you at a later
19	date. The testimony was clear, though.
20	JUDGE FULTON: Other than the proof
21	adduced in this case, is there has anything been

done at the Headquarters level, to resolve this

22

apparent difference of view between two Regional Offices, for the sake of the regulated community?

In other words, has anything been expressed to the regulated community in terms of guidance or policy on this point?

MS. JAMIESON: I do not recall that there is a policy or guidance on what occurred in this factual scenario. It's a fairly unique factual scenario.

JUDGE FULTON: All right, are we left with the view -- I understand that this was an inspection report; it wasn't a determination of the Program Manager in Region V, necessarily, but are we to be left with the sense here that if G&S was operating in the Chicago area, instead of where they are, that they would be treated as a commercial storer?

MS. JAMIESON: That is not the evidence that Region II found, and if you look at the Judge's opinion where he goes through the entire Region V inspection, point-by-point, and then states, what did Region II state or do in regard to these various allegations, you will find that the Judge was

satisfied that Region II conducted their very reasonable and over-broad investigation of this company to reach the conclusions that they did.

JUDGE FULTON: And the Headquarters reaction to the Region II analysis, accepted the purchase for resale idea as the vehicle for treating this as an unregulated entity, or did they also accept the under 500 gallons of PCB liquids onsite at any time, as a legitimate premise for non-regulation?

MS. JAMIESON: Their dialogue discussed the purchase of surplus lots of equipment, I believe, and not the second point that you raised.

There are two types of things that were found in the record, that G&S engages in, albeit, as I stated, not a party.

They purchase electrical equipment in lots. They receive drained electrical PCB-contaminated equipment, which is not subject to commercial storage approval requirements.

The record testimony shows that they also purchased PCB surplus equipment, but that if it was

1	PCB, it was received on the decision that they would
2	just buy it and decide, are we going to service it,
3	are we going to repair it, or, in the event that we
4	can't do such a thing, would we dispose of it?
5	In that respect, the Region and
6	Headquarters agreed that, in those instances, G&S is
7	a generator and not the commercial storer.
8	JUDGE FULTON: So, in Region III's view,
9	you don't see these as irreconcilable regulatory
10	scenarios?
11	MS. JAMIESON: We do not view it well,
12	our case was about a commercial storer with an
13	approval, and Region II's case, is an issue as to
14	whether or not, as the Appellant claims, they
15	required an approval.
16	JUDGE FULTON: No, I understand that, but
17	the
18	MS. JAMIESON: I missed your question, I'm
19	sorry.
20	JUDGE FULTON: Well, it's an impossible
21	question, I suppose, which is, if G&S were in Region
22	III, would the Region be comfortable regulating EPS

2

3

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18.

19

20

21

22

but not G&S?

MS. JAMIESON: If I were to review all the evidence that Ann Finnegan testified that she reviewed -- the bills of lading, the fact that she called Dusquene Power and Light and found out that they misfiled something on a manifest instead of a bill of lading, going in and out of that facility, I may conclude -- excuse me -- the Region might conclude the same thing as Region II.

The Region would have to examine the facts and examine exactly what is occurring. But the Judge was satisfied at the lower level, with Region II's investigation and analysis of what occurred.

JUDGE FULTON: Did Region III consult with Headquarters during the process of issuing a commercial storage authorization to EPS?

MS. JAMIESON: I do not believe that they consulted in regard to the issuance of the commercial storage permit. What they did consult about, was, as came up earlier in the Appellant's positions,

Appellant's position is that they were -- why were we in such concern about their financial assurance

2

3

4

. 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1.2

1.3

1.4

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

change, if you recall?

JUDGE FULTON: Yes.

MS. JAMIESON: And our -- the Region's position was, we consulted with Headquarters on that issue, because financial assurance didn't just cover Respondent's facility in Wheeling, West Virginia.

As to financial -- excuse me -- its financial assurance also covers two mobile TSCA treatment rigs, which go out into the country and decontaminate waste, so they were tied together, so we had to consult and they were -- excuse me, the record will show, they were trying -- the company was attempting to substitute an insurance policy for the closure fund, and the record will show that Ms.

Kremer found, and, perhaps, Headquarters, that there were problems with the terms of the insurance policy that they were seeking to acquire and the insurance policy could not be accepted in lieu of the closure fund.

While all that was going on, in September of 1998, we did our inspection in July -- authorized an inspection which occurred in July of '99, and then

. 5

all the sequence of events occurred, which both sides have fully articulated here today.

JUDGE FULTON: Now, you know, it's sort of accepted without question by the ALJ, and you also offer this idea in your brief, that because of this inquiry from EPS regarding changing their financial assurance mechanism, that led to a concern that they may be operating over capacity.

MS. JAMIESON: Yes.

JUDGE FULTON: Can you explain why one thought flows from the other?

MS. JAMIESON: The person who wrote the memo at the time that I discovered the memo in the course of this case, no longer is at the Agency, but the PCB Coordinator who went -- who was in the position at the time we issued the Complaint, reviewed that memorandum with me, and I believe there's testimony that the Agency was concerned that they would not have enough financial assurance for whatever they were storing or that waste might have been going in and out of the facility at quantities larger than what they were financially assured for.

The concern was, why did they want to have over \$200,000 of cash in a hurry, and what other -- if Ms. Bobby Wright could have been in the case, perhaps we could have more enlightenment on that, but she was gone from the Agency.

JUDGE FULTON: Okay.

MS. JAMIESON: And, in conclusion, I would like to say a word about the bar code numbers in Count Three. Appellant claims that the serial numbers in the ACTI lab data, do not match the bar codes that were burned in the oven in Exhibit 16-C -- excuse me, Exhibits 16-A, B, and C, which will show lists of bar codes that were burned at the various times of violation, when the time and temperature was run too short. The minimum temperature was failed to be maintained for the full two and a half hours.

And if you will read -- find in my brief, at Section -- I believe it is 3-D, a complete explanation as to why there were so -- the Region and Judge accepted that the numbers matched, the six-digit numbers in the lab data matches the six-digit bar code numbers of the items burned in the scrap

metal recovery oven. Thank you. 1 JUDGE FULTON: Any other questions? 2 3 (No response.) JUDGE FULTON: Thank you, Ms. Jamieson. 4 MS. JAMIESON: You're welcome. .5 6 JUDGE FULTON: Ms. Hwang? 7 MS. HWANG: Your Honor, Mr. Kropp will be doing rebuttal. 8 JUDGE FULTON: 9 Okay. Your Honors, if you agree with 10 MR. KROPP: respect to Count One, with what Ms. Jamieson just 11 told you about who is the generator, then you 12 absolutely cannot come to any other conclusion but 13 the fact that G&S, which says it's the generator, has 14 to be regulated, and must need a commercial storage 15 16 approval. 17 Justice Stein, you asked if anybody else is using the ownership argument? Absolutely. 18 That's how G&S is escaping its commercial storage 19 20 obligations. 21 JUDGE WOLGAST: Could I ask you a question 22 about that argument? I'm looking at your brief at

pages 18 and 19, about the ownership argument. 1 MR. KROPP: Yes. 2 3 JUDGE STEIN: And you rely on the definition section at 761.3, and looking at the 4 terms, and, particularly, the terms you highlight ٠5 there, I'm not understanding how ownership alone, 6 exempts you from commercial -- being categorized as a 7 commercial storer. 8 I thought you would also have to show that 9 some -- that the waste that was received, was not 10 generated by the utility; it was generated, in fact, 11 1.2 by EPS. MR. KROPP: Well, I think that's another 13 unclear part of the definition, because a commercial 14 storer is someone who stores PCB waste generated by 15 others, and then there's a "or," and it says "wastes 16 removed while servicing and brokered for disposal." 17 EPS doesn't remove any equipment from --18 doesn't service any equipment. It simply picks the 19 equipment up. 20 So I don't know whether the "and" is 21 disjunctive between those two, and whether the "or" 22

simply -- where the "or" goes and how you interpret it, but I read that to say that if I am the generator, if I own it, I make the decision, I do the testing, and I'm the owner, then the commercial storage approval requirement does not apply. I am not a commercial storer of that waste.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Again, I'm focusing -- I understand you're saying that you don't qualify under the disjunctive, "or that was removed while servicing the equipment owned by others," but just looking at the first part of the definition, even if you're an owner -- I mean, obviously, the definition says you can be an owner and be a commercial storer, because that's the way the definition begins.

MR. KROPP: Of the facility. Yes, we do own and operate the facility.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Okay.

MR. KROPP: But in order to be a commercial storer of PCB items, you must also engage in the storage activities involving either PCB waste generated by others, or that was removed while servicing, and EPS doesn't do any servicing of the

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

2

3

4

-5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

equipment.

of the equipment.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And you allege that you weren't engaged in storage activities of PCB waste generated by the utilities referenced in the case? MR. KROPP: Right, because our contract says that we become the owner when we take possession

JUDGE WOLGAST: But how does the fact that -- let's assume that you do become the owner, just for purposes of argument.

> MR. KROPP: Okay.

JUDGE WOLGAST: How does that then mean that the utility is suddenly not the generator?

MR. KROPP: If I own the equipment and I do the testing -- and I can refer you to a September 12, 2000 letter from Region II that says this -- if I do the testing, I own the equipment, and I make the decision that the equipment is waste at that point, they I am the generator.

That September 2000 letter deals with the question of who is the generator of PCB wastes.

> JUDGE STEIN: Aren't you just defining, by

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

mean, how can your contract sort of override a regulatory definition of what a generator is?

MR. KROPP: Well, the regulatory definition of the generator, is the person who makes the determination.

JUDGE STEIN: Whose process produces material.

MR. KROPP: Yes, right. So, if the equipment is usable equipment, and I pick it up, and I don't know the PCB content -- and, by the way, that was another issue that was raised, is that for G&S, they buy surplus equipment, while the regulations prohibit the buying and selling of PCB equipment. If it's greater than 500, you can't do that.

And they're avoiding their commercial storage obligation, because they don't store more than 500 gallons of liquid at one time. Transformers come through the door that, themselves, individually, contain more than 500 gallons, and this company is the largest disposer, according to the evidence that was presented, on the whole East Coast, and, we

, 1	believe, now in the whole United States. How can
2	Region II possibly, unless they're wearing a
3	blindfold when they walk into the facility, look at
4	those transformers and say, oh, well, there must not
5	be greater than 500 gallons, so you don't need a
6	commercial storage permit here?
7	JUDGE STEIN: I want to go back to the
8	definition of generator and just walk through it to
9	be sure I understand your argument.
10	MR. KROPP: Okay.
11	JUDGE STEIN: As I'm reading in 761.3, a
12	generator of PCB waste means any person whose act or
13	process produces PCBs that are regulated for
14	disposal, or whose act first causes PCBs or PCB items
15	to become subject to the disposal requirements.
16	MR. KROPP: Correct.
17	JUDGE STEIN: But didn't those things al
18	occur before they got to your facility?
19	MR. KROPP: They may have, Your Honor. I
20	think that at the time of these inspections and,
21	again, I think what we're dealing with, is an
22	absolutely unclear definition.

10

11

7

8

9

12 13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

I mean, that's why we have Region V concluding -- and I think, Justice Fulton, you're absolutely right -- if G&S had been in Region V, I think they would have had to have had a commercial storage approval facility, and to have -- in this initial decision, the tribunal below found Ms. Finnegan's testimony to be credible when she concludes that, as a result of Region V's inspection of G&S, she's not sure that Region V understands how to interpret the regulations.

Well, if Region V doesn't understand how to do it and Region II is interpreting one way and now we have Region III saying something else, how can there possibly be fair warning about the actual implementation of these definitions?

I agree with you that it's absolutely unclear.

Well, I'm not sure that I JUDGE STEIN: was suggesting -- that particular definition looks very much to me like the RCRA definition of generator, of someone whose act or process makes it subject to the regulation.

2

3

4

.5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

MR. KROPP: And I think some of those were borrowed.

know, Region V, Region III, Region II, in your fairnotice issue, you know, is a somewhat separate issue.
But I was looking at this generator definition for
purposes of this commercial storage definition, and
I'm not convinced that, by contract, that whatever
your contract terms are, can override the regulatory
definition.

MR. KROPP: And if you conclude that, that's the way G&S operates. They have a contract under which they buy supposedly surplus equipment, but they don't even know the PCB concentration of it when they buy it.

So, if we have a problem at EPS and you decide that that interpretation is the way things need to go against EPS, how can the Agency explain the lack of enforcement for commercial storage approval against G&S? I'm out of time. I thank you for your time.

JUDGE FULTON: All right, any final

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

202-347-3700

410-684-2550

3

4

.5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

questions?

2 (No response.)

JUDGE FULTON: Okay, we have one small loose end. There was this thought about the Region possibly submitting something to us on this question of Agency guidance on the definition of "ownership."

If there is anything to be submitted on that, can you please file it?

MS. JAMIESON: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE FULTON: Let's file it by -- let's have it filed by the end of the first week of January, January 5th, and in the event that a response is warranted -- I don't know that there will be, but you're certainly free to file a response, and that response would be due a week later, the 12th of January.

MR. KROPP: Thank you, Your Honor.

JUDGE FULTON: Okay, well, thank you very much for the energy invested in this morning's argument. We very much appreciated the learning that came from both the briefs, but also the opportunity to, as well, be together this morning.

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646

1
2
3
4
-5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

appreciate your patience with our questions. We
understand fully, the gravity of the matter, and
certainly take away from this, some additional
thoughts that will factor into our deliberations in
this case. Thank you.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the oral argument was concluded.)

22

	T	T	т —	8
A	18:14 106:3	33:14	applied 7:11 44:1	38:21 40:9 48:2
abandonment	address 21:16	allotted 3:10	51:9 68:16 73:14	49:2 52:6 55:10
60:11	82:13 87:3	allow 20:5	85:7	55:18 56:3 75:3
ability 5:1 23:22	addressed 29:15	allowed 3:18 8:19	applies 33:7 51:9	79:5 80:15 81:17
able 29:18 43:8,15	addresses 11:13	22:16 23:17 25:5	73:1 80:2	97:18,22 98:1
65:7 80:21	addressing 18:9	42:13 56:19	apply 19:7 20:3	100:10 102:9
absolutely 43:15	adduced 89:21	alter 39:7	23:18 28:3,5	105:20 106:8
48:19 49:20	adequate 60:10	Alternatively 19:6	33:18,22 34:11	arguments 3:17
97:13,18 102:22	61:8	ambiguous 40:20	35:16 48:21	4:15,20 6:20 82:6
103:3,16	adhere 59:11	amend 41:12	49:20 79:8 80:2	arrangement 17:18
abundance 37:2	Administrative	American 76:15	81:20 99:5	20:8 25:7,12 45:2
45:8 46:7	28:18	amount 39:20	applying 7:20	arrived 56:12 57:5
accede 3:15	Administrator	40:12 56:16	19:20 23:4,5	arrives 85:19
accept 30:14 42:9	38:13 39:13	68:20,22	30:14	articles 68:4
43:3 71:15 91:8	40:17 41:6 59:19	amounts 61:16	appreciate 4:18	articulated 95:2
acceptable 42:15	Administrators	ample 17:11 62:1	14:9 75:3 106:1	aside 31:22 33:15
acceptance 52:9	60:2	amplify 29:18	appreciated 105:20	37:22 47:2 49:3
accepted 23:17	Administrator's	analysis 88:16 91:5	approval 8:8,22	asked 43:20,21,22
42:15 91:5 94:18	41:2	93:13	19:20 20:4 35:15	44:15 47:11
95:4 96:20	admits 17:17	Ann 30:5 84:1	37:10 38:18 39:9	49:14 53:16 54:5
accepting 29:9	admitted 29:22	89:11 93:3	39:12 40:5,6,10	55:20 63:13
88:10	ado 5:21	ANNA 1:21	40:11,15,20	66:18 67:10
accommodate	adopting 30:13	answer 4:8 31:6	41:16,20,21 43:4	71:11 87:6 97:17
72:15	advanced 52:19	answered 44:9	44:14 52:7 53:4,6	asking 5:2 15:7,13
account 43:14	advances 77:22	47:10	53:8 57:3 59:10	26:21 63:20
accurate 49:13	advise 4:6	answering 4:7	59:18 60:1 61:13	asserted 3:20 74:1
58:7,13	advises 55:4	anybody 97:17	63:1 68:21 78:13	assessments 29:3
accusations 88:8	advocacy 23:1	anyway 27:14	79:18,20 84:3	assistance 3:13
acquire 94:17	25:11	apologize 55:4,7	85:12 88:21 89:4	associated 81:21
act 71:20 81:4,6	AEP 56:10	apparent 90:1	91:20 92:13,15	82:1,3
102:12,14 103:21	affirmation 89:6	apparently 55:6	97:16 99:5 103:5	assume 54:16 80:5
ACTI 96:10	age 20:13	78:1	104:20	100:9
action 11:6 25:4	Agencies 11:16	Appeal 1:6	approved 20:3	assumed 56:11
54:20	Agency 1:2 2:17,22 16:7 25:3 63:11	Appeals 1:1,16,19 APPEARANCES	38:19 42:5,13	assumes 80:13
actions 14:7	68:18 71:8 74:20		approximately 6:8	assuming 9:15 39:6
activities 21:11	75:3 82:8 87:9	2:1 appeared 42:5	67:19	Assumption 45:13
27:15 32:2 36:19	95:14,18 96:5		arbitrariness 22:6	45:18
37:17 48:2,3	104:18 105:6	appearing 12:7 appears 42:12	23:13	assurance 16:12
72:12 77:18 80:1	ago 20:3	Appelant 2:6,13	arbitrary 10:15,21	26:16,18 38:4,5
80:22 81:14,20	agree 9:15 78:2	Appellant 3:8 5:7	11:20,22 21:18 21:21 22:4,19	38:12 39:7 40:4
81:22,22 82:10	97:10 103:16	6:4 8:2 19:11	23:3,7 24:13	40:16 60:8,10
84:18,20 88:22	agreed 34:12,13	59:3,8 60:14,22	Arch 2:20	62:17 93:22 94:5
99:20 100:3	92:6	62:3,5 63:12	area 33:17 47:4,13	94:8 95:7,19
activity 21:5 23:12	ahead 53:9	68:16 70:10	•	assurances 8:10 9:1
23:12 30:20 31:1	al 102:17	75:11 76:9 77:6	48:13,16 49:6,10 50:20,22 51:1	26:11
50:2,3 79:9 80:3	albeit 84:16 91:15	77:22 78:12	53:17 54:2 67:9	assured 95:22
actual 16:13	ALJ 84:1 95:4	79:10 81:4,5	68:4 90:15	assures 61:14 ATCI 58:13
103:14	allegation 88:15	82:10 83:16	areas 29:22 30:1	
adamantly 25:8	allegations 36:1	84:20 85:6,11	argue 51:9	attempted 63:8 83:2
added 34:4,5	88:13 90:22	86:3 88:7 92:14	argued 35:17 77:10	attempting 94:13
addition 22:20	allege 14:10 100:2	96:9	arguing 48:3 75:11	
23:15 28:12	alleged 4:12 24:15	Appellant's 60:3,20	argument 1:12,14	attention 16:20
34:22 62:3 68:15	25:16 47:5 59:16	65:14 93:20,21	3:4,7,14,18 4:2	attorney 73:22
86:4 87:20 additional 9:20	60:14	appellate 28:14	4:19 5:11,16 6:7	authority 40:22 41:11,12 60:1
additivital 9:20	alleging 20:20	applicable 6:18	14:14 23:1 37:22	authorization
'		-PP-icable 0.10	17.17 43.1 31.44	ลนเทงเ เรลแงก

		_		Page 103
36:21 39:10 41:4	96:18 102:1	buying 101:14	23:20 24:20 30:1	17:4,13 24:1
41:4 52:18 80:14	believed 71:8		47:5 55:14,20	47:17 85:18,19
80:16 93:16	benefit 4:17	C	81:6 89:12	89:19
authorized 20:2	best 5:1 53:12	C 1:16 2:2 3:1	certainly 27:4	clearly 11:17 13:12
22:15 94:21	beyond 13:9	96:12	105:14 106:3	16:9,21 17:5
avail 23:20	big 26:20	calendar 16:14	certainty 21:8	21:20 36:13
available 5:17	big-sounding 78:15	call 4:4 42:10 73:7	certificates 86:1,2	54:11 56:20
availing 25:1	bill 85:1 93:7	called 8:6 28:17	CFR 7:10 12:19	CLERK 106:6
avoiding 101:16	bills 93:4	31:4 41:21 56:10	55:11	client 27:2 55:4
aware 3:19 43:13	bit 12:6 18:10	93:5	challenge 52:21	client's 22:11
74:10,22	blindfold 102:3	cancelled 88:11	challenged 52:14	close 4:9 67:21
awfully 80:20	Board 1:1,16,19	capacities 33:12,18	challenging 28:13	80:20
a.m 1:16 3:2	3:13 4:4,6,19 7:8	35:15	52:16	closing 58:16
	28:21	capacitors 44:4	chamber 61:15	closure 8:10 9:1
<u> </u>	Board's 3:5	47:10 51:10	change 16:11 39:22	38:6 60:8 94:14
B 96:12	Bobby 96:3	56:10,11,13,18	40:15,21 62:16	94:18
back 33:21 42:8,12	body 29:8,12	57:4 75:10 76:3,8	94:1	Coast 9:10 22:13
42:16 48:1,12	borrowed 104:2	76:18 77:3,12,17	changing 95:6	101:22
53:7 54:22 55:11	bounds 82:19	79:11 82:1 85:10	charge 31:7,9,10	code 65:13 66:22
86:6,16 102:7	Box 2:11	capacity 33:14 38:1	charged 19:15	69:14 96:8,22
bad 9:21 10:5 11:7	boxes 34:5	57:13 95:8	Charlene 34:8	codes 58:10,10
11:9,14 13:16,19	boy 34:6	capital 31:22	41:21	68:22 96:11,13
14:18 15:1 16:3	breaking 82:1	carefully 27:4,7	Charleston 2:12	column 14:16
badgered 15:4	brief 6:15 15:18	carrier 31:15	check 18:8	combustion 61:19
bad-faith 10:18	75:7 79:15 80:19	carry 26:20	checks 88:11	come 31:7 42:13
balance 30:9	81:5 88:2 95:5	carryover 30:18	Cheryl 2:15 5:15	50:21 74:6,8 88:5
Baltimore 2:5	96:17 97:22	cars 22:17	59:3	97:13 101:19
bank 47:9 77:16	briefly 25:19	case 3:22 7:2,6,12	Chicago 90:15	comes 35:1 43:3,12
bar 58:9,10 65:13	briefs 4:21 6:17	7:13 8:2 10:8,17	chooses 36:18	50:15,18 51:14
66:22 68:22	29:18 105:21	12:1,22 19:8,9,10	chose 46:21	51:19 80:19
69:14 96:8,10,13	bring 15:15,15	21:21 22:3 23:18	chosen 52:21	comfortable 92:22
96:22	16:20 31:15 35:6	24:19 28:16 29:5 29:12 33:12	CID's 29:14	coming 23:14 27:6
base 8:5 26:4 31:4	bringing 4:19 brochure 9:7	38:22 39:17	circumstance 78:21 circumstances	comment 14:9 commerce 55:13
based 10:14,20 11:19 12:2,10	brochures 17:1	43:20 46:11	24:12 54:1	61:9,20
88:4	broken 76:19	56:15 57:4 58:15	citation 36:5	commercial 8:8,21
bases 7:16	brokered 17:9 33:8	59:5,15 60:3 62:9	civil 87:15	17:10 19:20 20:2
basically 54:6	98:17	62:13,21 65:22	claim 3:20 9:18	21:2 22:1,8 23:10
55:12	brought 33:21	66:21 72:11 73:5	10:18 21:4 72:13	25:15 28:4 33:6
basis 10:11,19	36:10 58:5 62:4	74:5 75:10,14	claimed 4:12	33:11,17 35:15
50:13 56:2	burden 57:9,12	76:8,11 80:9 81:5	claims 19:8,9 92:14	36:21 37:1,7,9,14
began 37:22	62:6	81:14 83:5 85:6	96:9	37:18 39:9 43:4
beginning 15:3	burn 50:14 60:15	88:14 89:21	clarification 47:2	44:14 48:17,21
26:1	burned 77:8 96:11	92:12,13 95:14	clarify 11:9 63:18	52:6,18 53:3,5,8
begins 99:14	96:13,22	96:3 100:4 106:5	69:16,20	53:19 55:6 56:2
behalf 2:6,13,22	burning 27:19 28:2	cases 50:17 87:8	clarity 4:20	57:2 59:9 63:1,5
5:6 27:2	59:13 61:2	cash 96:2	classification 10:21	65:22 68:17
believe 7:12 8:16	burns 32:7,14	categories 43:7	11:21 12:1 21:19	72:10 73:14
10:2,5 41:8 42:14	50:14	51:11	21:22 22:4,7 23:7	75:12 79:17,19
47:16 57:6,21	business 3:20 4:1,6	categorized 98:7	24:14	80:21 81:1 84:2
58:14 62:12	4:12 20:10 21:5	causes 71:22	classifications	84:10,15 85:8,12
63:20 64:20 68:5	21:12 22:11 27:3	102:14	10:15	88:20 89:3 90:16
69:11 70:8 71:7	37:11 53:11 60:4	caution 37:2 45:8	clean 72:14	91:20 92:7,12
72:21 73:1 81:18	70:10 83:15,18	46:7	cleaning 18:2	93:16,18 97:15
83:8 85:4 91:12	buy 92:2 101:13	CBI 85:20	cleanups 60:12	97:19 98:7,8,14
93:17 95:17	104:13,15	certain 3:21 23:17	clear 4:10 12:15,19	99:4,6,13,19

	T	_	T	
103:4 104:7,19	concerned 13:2,6	continue 53:11	cradle-to-grave	85:2 92:1 99:3
commercially	95:18	86:15	35:20 36:13,16	100:18 103:6
37:21 52:3,8	concerns 12:12	CONTINUED 2:1	67:1 69:1 72:6	decisions 23:4,9,10
59:21 69:3 75:17	15:5	continues 87:10	CRCLA 42:19	declined 3:15
commingled 34:15	conclude 82:13	continuous 50:13	credibility 29:2,3	decontaminate
34:17	93:8,9 104:11	contract 34:18,21	66:20	49:15 94:10
communication	concluded 106:8	44:22 51:14,17	credible 29:20	decontaminated
15:19	concludes 103:8	100:5 101:1,2	30:15 84:1 103:7	44:12 48:14 49:9
communications	concluding 103:2	104:8,9,12	criminal 87:17,18	49:21 50:1 51:3
	conclusion 45:5		criteria 10:2	
15:6,17 17:13		contracts 17:2,13		55:11,17
community 90:2,4	58:14 96:7 97:13	29:12 45:1 54:6,7	critical 17:8	decontamination
companies 7:14,14	conclusions 7:22	contrary 42:17	cross 58:1	24:4 27:11 44:13
9:16 32:4 72:8	29:1 91:3	contrast 85:7	crowded 63:9	49:18 55:21 61:8
company 8:2,6,14	concurred 51:22	control 72:2	current 19:18,22	72:13
8:15,16 31:14	condition 41:3,5	controlled 12:21	customer 7:15 8:5	defense 6:9,10 19:5
43:6,10 44:3 48:8	conditions 40:10	conversation 89:14	26:4 31:4	62:4,7
54:4,12,13,20	41:1,13	convinced 104:8	customers 8:6 9:4	defer 4:8 21:13
56:10 60:9 83:1,6	conduct 13:13	Coordinator 34:9	17:3,14 26:1 31:5	28:7,22
86:20,21 91:3	conducted 63:2	95:15	53:12 65:17 72:7	define 11:14 73:17
94:12 101:20	91:1	correct 5:12 13:20	CX-1 68:17	defined 71:19
Company's 14:12	confidential 3:19	48:5,10 70:17	CX-10 76:2,2	defining 100:22
36:20 54:18	4:1,5,12	71:6 78:18 88:16	CX-12 66:14	definition 33:6 35:2
compare 30:12	confidentiality	102:16	CX-2 68:21	39:15 48:21 71:4
Complainant's	4:11	corresponding		74:14,19 79:1
12:4	conflicting 30:9	69:14	D	84:9,11 98:4,14
complained 8:18	connections 74:17	cost 31:18	d 3:1 71:21 72:1	99:11,12,14
complaining 22:22	consequences	costs 26:10	Dan 84:2	101:3,5 102:8,22
complaint 6:11	25:20	cost-producing	data 57:22 58:2,4,7	103:19,20 104:6
15:15 21:15	consideration 3:15	26:12	58:7,13,13 60:20	104:7,10 105:6
33:13 34:2 39:3	consistent 7:11	counsel 2:19 5:2,4	96:10,21	definitions 103:15
58:5 61:22 66:3	consolidated 77:7	6:4 28:7 59:3	date 47:14 64:17	deleted 45:18
87:21 95:16		count 33:6,13 34:1	65:18,19,19 76:9	deliberations 106:4
	constantly 14:2	*	76:21 89:19	
Complaint's 12:7	Constitutional	34:1 47:5,5,7,8,9		demands 19:10
complete 96:18	11:17	47:10 51:10 56:4	dated 3:5 64:16	demonstrated 10:6
completely 83:9	constraints 11:17	56:6 57:9,9,20	dates 47:5	demonstrates
completion 63:12	consult 93:14,19	60:14 62:13 63:9	day 15:7 20:13	16:21
compliance 15:9,10	94:11	63:10 67:21 70:2	50:14,16 51:1	denied 23:21 41:19
16:15 26:10,13	consulted 93:18	75:9 96:9 97:11	54:3 78:11 83:3	departure 40:10
37:2 43:8 54:12	94:4	counted 67:19	days 14:20 17:12	deposited 38:8
complied 27:19	contact 42:8	country 94:9	32:7 37:15 56:19	derive 29:3
83:3	contain 39:20	counts 57:17 58:18	57:2,5 78:5,22	describe 25:19
comply 37:12 83:2	44:18 101:20	59:16,16 61:22	de 84:16	89:11
computer 27:8	contained 6:11	62:9	deal 87:11	described 11:16
concede 41:11	8:11 64:2,3	course 4:2 58:5	dealing 102:21	88:22
conceded 81:4	contaminated	77:14,20 79:2	deals 100:20	describing 62:12
concentration	46:10 60:16	95:14	debriefing 55:1	descriptive 68:13
104:14	85:14 91:19	court 6:2,17,21 7:1	December 1:15	designated 64:22
concentrations	contemplates 11:6	11:9,15 65:6 87:8	decide 92:2 104:17	designation 71:16
64:9 66:5 67:3	contemporaneou	courtroom 4:10	deciding 71:16	73:1
69:16,18 70:14	64:17	Court's 16:20	decision 10:13	designations 67:12
77:5	contend 11:5 29:4	cover 38:9,15 94:5	11:18 14:17,19	designed 39:19
concept 21:19	44:16 57:8 78:6	covering 17:12	21:22 23:8 24:16	54:11 79:16
72:18	79:7	covers 69:22 94:8	28:18 37:9 46:16	desire 36:20
concern 11:13 12:1	contending 28:12	co-counsel 5:7,17	52:1 56:15,17	despite 25:12
15:22 62:18 87:6	content 101:11	5:18 21:13	58:12,17 59:7	destination 46:1
93:22 95:7 96:1	context 16:19	cradle 65:15	71:17 72:3 73:6,9	76:15 86:5,9,14
•	COMICAL TO. 17	crause 05.15		70.13 00.3,9,14
COMPANY OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	er konstatu dela kanta da esta di transcriatione e	Carry and the second	PA-12 CONTRACTOR STATE	

1, 1, 1,55,01	46 00 51 5 57 6	D C 1 2	. 72.11	110 11 00 6
destined 55:21	46:22 51:5 57:6	D.C 1:3	enterprise 73:11	equal 19:11 28:6
destroy 61:18	59:21 65:15 67:1		entire 89:11 90:19	equate 82:9
detail 82:22 85:21	69:1,4 71:21,22		entitled 80:17	equipment 7:15 9:9
determination 35:7	72:2,4,14 77:8	e 3:1,1 15:12	entity 13:13 19:1	9:13 17:22 20:15
35:13 90:12	78:7 79:6,12,16	EAB 7:6 29:8	24:11,17 83:15	25:13 26:6,6 27:6
101:6	81:10 82:4 86:1,2	earlier 6:3 16:12	83:15 91:7	27:9 33:11,16
determine 54:11	98:17 102:14,15	71:11 81:18	Environmental 1:1	34:12,14,15,17
determined 41:6	dispose 51:6 72:9	82:14 93:20	1:2,7 2:17 3:7 6:5	34:18,20 35:1,6
77:1	72:10 73:6 77:17	early 31:2 37:8	76:16	35:16,18 36:13
detriment 14:13	85:2 92:4	East 9:10 22:13	EPA 1:14,16,19	36:17 37:20
devastating 25:18	disposed 17:6 18:1	101:22	5:13,15 10:9,19	43:12,17,22
devoting 6:8,10	18:3,5 76:19	economic 26:22	12:5,10,22 13:1,5	45:10,15,20 46:5
dialogue 89:15	disposer 37:8	31:2	13:12,22 14:8	46:8,10 48:20,22
91:11	101:21	Edward 2:8 5:7	16:10 17:17	48:22 49:13 50:9
dictate 40:4	disposing 17:22	effort 36:13 37:12	32:20,22 35:3	50:15,18 51:2,4,7
dielectric 9:11	disposition 47:21	efforts 13:20	37:5,5 38:18,22	52:8 55:5 57:12
difference 18:18,21	49:8 52:2	eight 78:4 85:15	41:9,14,19 42:4,8	58:11 59:14,17
24:8 84:19 90:1	dispositive 71:17	either 19:1,8,9	42:16 43:20 47:3	60:5,16 61:3 76:7
different 7:19,22	dispute 20:9,12,18	46:16 99:20	47:11,11 48:11	77:7 84:22 85:3,5
14:7 48:2,3,4	dissimilar 10:4	elaborate 27:8,10	54:16,22 57:11	85:14,16,18
85:15 87:2,4,5,9	dissimilarly 16:22	elected 36:22	58:1,2 60:1 69:13	91:12,17,19,22
87:10,22 101:1	distinct 79:22	Electric 76:15	EPA's 14:17 15:21	98:18,19,20
differently 9:17	83:17	electrical 9:9,12	19:9 21:7 30:6,10	99:10 100:1,7,14
14:12 45:16	distinction 17:7	20:14 26:5 59:14	54:10 58:18	100:17,18 101:10
difficult 67:17	49:7	59:17 60:16 61:3	81:19	101:10,13,14
82:21	distribution 55:13	72:8 85:14,16	EPS 3:8 5:4 6:5 7:3	104:13
digit 96:21	dividing 6:7	91:17,18	8:1,7,18 9:7	escaping 97:19
diked 47:4 48:13	Division 87:18	element 26:13	10:10,12,20	ESQ 2:2,8,15,16
48:16 49:6,10	Docket 1:9	eloquently 45:21	12:15 13:2,4,19	establish 9:18
Dillon 29:14	Doctrine 58:21	elucidate 6:20 11:3	15:4,10 16:15	establishing 64:5
direct 11:10	document 12:7	encountered 74:4,6	18:20 19:2,4,7,9	Evaluation 17:18
direction 65:4	13:9,12,16 32:6	ends 7:18	21:10 22:1,21	event 4:3 92:3
directly 60:7	41:5 89:5	energy 105:19	23:5,10,19,19,21	105:12
Director 14:2	documentation	enforce 24:16	24:22 25:15 27:4	events 95:1
disadvantage 25:15	31:13 32:3,10,22	enforcement 6:9	30:20,22 31:3	evidence 13:8,15
disassociating 45:3	42:22 43:11 54:5	7:3 9:19 14:1	32:6 34:3,4,16,18	15:1 16:20 25:12
discerned 67:15,18	57:15,17 88:12	15:9,14 19:5,12	34:19 35:4,20	29:9,12 35:22
discover 46:2	documented 35:21	25:4 54:20 62:4	36:2,7,11,17,19	60:22 62:1 68:15
discovered 31:3	89:17	73:22 104:19	36:22 37:8 38:5,7	75:18 76:11,17
95:13	documents 32:8	engage 20:10,19,21	38:13 39:4,18	83:21 87:1 88:11
discretion 11:16	doing 41:18 87:5,9	30:22 99:19	41:14,16,21 42:4	90:17 93:3
discuss 59:5 62:8	97:8	engaged 70:10 79:9	44:20 49:14,17	101:21
discussed 29:7	dollars 12:13,14	79:10 82:10 89:1	50:13 51:2,6 53:3	exact 89:12
91:11	31:21 53:2	100:3	53:18 56:20	exactly 47:11 93:11
discussing 24:2	door 34:3 35:1,6	engages 21:11	57:15 58:9,10	examination 58:1
disjunctive 98:22	43:16 50:18	27:10 30:20 60:4	66:1 70:9 71:14	examine 93:10,11
99:9	51:14,20 101:19	65:16,17 69:2	73:11 76:3 85:7	example 32:3 46:16
dismantled 56:14	doubt 4:17	72:10 85:11	85:19 86:4,7,11	84:21
dismantling 9:13	Dr 45:20 61:11	91:15	92:22 93:16 95:6	examples 82:6,8,11
disparity 14:15	drain 17:22	engaging 72:12	98:12,18 99:22	excedance 64:6
25:17 31:2	drained 18:2 91:18	80:3 81:12,15	104:16,18	exceeded 59:18
disposal 7:17 8:16	draw 45:5 49:6	84:19,20	EPS's 9:4 12:12	63:4
9:9,11,13 17:7,9	drive 22:16	enlightenment 96:4	15:5 16:11 18:17	exception 20:7
17:15 22:12	due 105:15	ensure 11:18	19:8 21:12 26:1	80:18
25:13 29:10 30:4	Dusquene 93:5	ensures 61:8	29:11 32:18 34:8	exceptions 20:6
33:9 38:9 46:18	dynamic 29:5	entered 63:7	35:19 37:16,19	24:20 25:2,2 44:1
forma- a postación a discissión de la constanción de la constanció				

	г	т		Tage III
excuse 10:10 15:3,9	28:4 31:15,19	105:8,10,14	fought 25:8	further 4:20 5:21
19:8 76:3 79:9	33:21 34:3,4,15	filed 38:6 39:2	found 10:8 13:15	18:4 55:21
93:8 94:7,11	34:19 37:6,7	105:11	14:20 36:14	
96:12	39:18,19 40:12	fill 31:12 41:7	56:12 62:5 70:11	G
exemption 20:8	42:14 47:4 60:18	final 104:22	77:4 79:11 83:14	G 3:1
49:20 51:8 56:20	63:8 72:11 75:14	financial 8:9 9:1	83:22 84:21 89:1	gallons 59:22 84:4
57:1 74:2 77:22	76:16,18 77:12	16:12 26:10,15	90:18 91:15 93:5	85:9 91:8 101:18
79:6,16 80:1	79:5 80:21 81:6,9	26:18,20 38:3,5	94:15 103:6	101:20 102:5
81:20	81:9 85:1 86:5,9	38:12 39:7 40:4	four 53:1 87:15	gap 41:7
exemptions 23:17	86:14 87:20 88:5	40:15 60:8,10	framed 71:1	GE 38:22 58:21
23:20,22 24:21	88:18 93:7 94:6	62:17 93:22 94:5	free 105:14	generate 72:8
30:13 55:14	95:21 99:15,16	94:7,8 95:6,19	front 76:13 83:19	generated 33:7,19
57:10,18	102:3,18 103:5	financially 95:22	full 96:16	98:11,11,15
exempts 98:7	fact 8:19,21 9:4	find 4:5 11:14 16:5	fully 6:14 11:3	99:21 100:4
exhibit 9:5,6 12:4,8	16:10 17:16	16:6 58:18 72:5	28:16 62:1 83:7	generating 31:18
17:20 66:13,14	18:19 22:14,20	75:4,7 82:21	95:2 106:2	generation 45:4
75:21 76:1,12	23:16 24:19 25:5	83:17 84:10	Fulton 1:16 3:3 5:9	generator 35:9,13
85:20,22 96:11	30:14 33:16	85:22 86:18 88:2	5:13,18,20 6:1,13	35:14 45:3,7,8
exhibits 17:12 64:8	34:17 36:7 40:5	89:6,7,18 90:22	11:4 18:7 19:13	46:11 52:2 65:22
67:6 96:12	42:1 57:22 58:12	96:17	19:17 20:9,16	71:17,18,19
existence 49:16	64:1 83:3 85:4,9	findings 29:2 62:2	21:3,10,16 23:6	72:19,19,22 73:4
expect 54:10	93:4 97:14 98:11	Finnegan 30:5 84:1	24:5 25:14,19	73:7 74:14 76:10
expense 52:22	100:8	89:11 93:3	26:2,8,12,15,19	76:14 92:7 97:12
expensive 26:7	factor 106:4	Finnegan's 103:7	27:13 28:2,9,11	97:14 99:3
experience 73:22	factors 7:4	firm 5:8	30:16 31:8,17,22	100:13,19,21
expert 30:7,11,11	facts 14:20 93:10	first 3:9 10:3 12:3	32:12,15,19 33:3	101:3,5 102:8,12
explain 95:10	factual 90:8,8	19:17 20:7 23:8	40:19 41:8 42:21	103:21 104:6
104:18	fail 19:9	29:7 38:8 47:14	44:16 45:1 48:6	generators 69:3
explanation 62:16	failed 61:1 62:6	54:19 58:4 59:7	52:3,9,13 53:13	70:9 72:7 86:1
96:19	96:15	71:21 72:22 73:6	54:6 58:22 62:15	generically 48:7
explanations 86:20	failure 24:14,15	74:3,5 87:13 88:5	65:3,6 66:7,10	give 47:12,18 57:16
explicitly 15:21	59:11	99:11 102:14	67:14,22 68:9	78:12
exposed 61:21	fair 19:11 38:21	105:11	70:22 71:4,9	given 14:19 24:7
expressed 12:12	58:20,20 103:14	firsthand 21:7 27:2	72:17 73:3,10	50:22 64:17
18:21 90:4	104:4	fit 3:18	78:14,20 79:4,14	66:21 68:19
expressing 17:5	fairly 82:20 90:8	fits 24:12 82:19	80:4,13 81:8 84:8	69:19 83:3
extent 83:1	faith 9:21 10:5 11:7	fitting 14:15	84:13 89:5,8,20	glad 36:5
extreme 12:13,14	11:10,14 13:17	five 3:10 6:12 87:15	90:10 91:4 92:8	go 14:19 16:5 32:9
13:6	13:19 14:18 15:1	flip 12:6	92:16,20 93:14	49:9 72:19 86:6
e-mail 25:9	16:3	flows 95:11	94:2 95:3,10 96:6	86:15 94:9 102:7
e-mails 89:13	fall 48:3,8 55:13	fluid 9:11	97:2,4,6,9 103:2	104:18
C-India 07.13	56:1 57:10	focused 23:7	104:22 105:3,10	goes 14:17 90:19
F	falls 57:12	focusing 50:5 99:7	105:18	99:1
face 13:9,11,15	false 16:9 21:4	follow 55:10	Fulton's 82:13	going 10:11 15:15
40:14	familiar 6:18 73:21	following 75:2	function 81:13	15:15 22:8 27:20
facie 62:9,13,21	far 32:15 85:8	Foods 10:8	fund 12:13,14,16	37:11 48:1 49:14
75:10	favors 88:10	force 28:6	12:16,20,20,22	51:2 53:11 55:11
facilitate 78:7,8	faxed 64:20 69:11	forgive 36:3	13:3,5 38:6,7,9	60:19 61:20
79:12,13	69:11	form 9:21	38:15 53:7 94:14	85:21 92:2,3 93:7
facilitated 82:4	fear 52:22	former 31:4	94:19	94:20 95:21
facilitating 82:2	fees 53:3	formerly 45:13	fundamental 24:8	good 3:3 5:5,20,22
facilities 24:9 79:16	fell 37:18	forth 6:15 7:10	74:18	59:2
79:19	felt 54:13	10:1 54:15,22	funds 16:1 31:21	Government's
facility 9:9 17:9,10	field 7:9 9:13 14:10	57:1	furnace 27:12 28:5	62:13
20:3 22:1,7,9,12	51:16	forward 4:14 14:19	32:5,16,16,17	grater 64:10
23:10 27:16,21	file 36:22 38:5	68:16	33:1	grater 64:10 gravity 106:2
23.10 27.10,21	1116 30.22 30.3	30.10		gravity 100.2

		r		
great 82:22 87:6,11	hassle 36:11	Hwang 2:2 5:5,6,21	importance 14:10	49:17 63:12,17
greater 36:14	hazardous 31:11	5:22 6:14 9:22	72:18	64:17,18 66:8,11
38:10 46:3,17	36:7 46:6,13	11:8 13:18 14:22	important 47:20	66:16 82:15
56:13 85:9	headquarters 7:20	18:7,16 19:16	59:5 60:6 61:6,7	88:18 89:9 90:11
101:15 102:5	25:10 51:22 89:2	20:1,12,20 21:6	78:10	90:20 94:21,22
greater-than-500	89:6,16,22 91:4	21:13 22:6 23:15	importantly 37:21	103:8
46:21 51:7	92:6 93:15 94:4	24:6,18 25:18,21	impossible 92:20	inspections 34:10
greater-than-500	94:15	26:5,9,14,18 27:1	inaccurate 13:7	39:2 55:1 63:2
51:4	hear 42:16 55:19	27:17 28:7,10	inappropriate	69:10 87:16
grow 37:11	62:16 64:12 65:7	29:6 30:16,17	13:12	102:20
grown 9:8 38:7	83:12	97:6,7	include 40:11,22	inspector 43:16
guess 13:14 18:9	heard 28:20 42:4	hypothetically 9:16	included 62:12	49:11 55:19 63:7
80:7	hearing 4:8,9,14	I suppose section of the section of	including 14:1 25:1	63:8 64:16 69:6
guidance 35:3 74:9	39:3 58:6	I	34:8	71:11 88:9
74:20 75:1 89:2,2	held 1:14 77:10	idea 45:3,4 72:17	incoming 76:12,22	inspectors 34:2
90:5,7 105:6	79:2	91:6 95:5	incomplete 61:19	43:20 53:16
G&S 8:6,14,19,21	helpful 4:5 64:5	identical 83:6	inconsistencies	60:18 63:13,19
9:5,7 13:21 14:4	hey 42:10	identified 27:7	29:21	66:17 67:19 68:7
15:5,9 16:21 17:3	high 62:6	identifies 27:8	inconsistent 35:18	70:6
17:5,14,14,17,21	highlight 98:5	identify 5:3 58:10	incorporate 12:18	instance 23:9 56:9
17:22 18:19,19	highlighted 63:16	identifying 65:14	incorrect 16:2	instances 30:2 66:5
19:3,3,6,19,19,22	highly 83:22 88:6	II 7:19 8:15 14:1,11	increase 40:11	92:6
20:2,6,9,13,20	high-level 88:8	15:4,7,8,11,13	41:15	instructive 11:15
21:7 22:10,11	history 15:9 54:21	20:5 23:2,11,16	incur 26:10	insufficient 61:18
23:5,11,16,18	hold 77:14	24:15 25:8,10,11	indefinitely 78:13	insurance 94:13,16
25:5,13 26:6,9	holder 12:21	30:5 35:3,4,11	78:15	94:17
27:16,18 28:3	holding 77:19	51:21,21 83:14	indicate 25:10 55:5	intend 4:1
29:9 30:14 31:4	holds 59:7	83:21 84:21	65:19 69:1 77:19	intended 56:21
32:10 35:5 36:9	Honor 5:5,12 9:6	87:22 88:14,16	indicated 30:7	intended 30:21
74:7 83:15,19	9:22 10:5,8,10,18	89:15 90:18,21	indicates 17:21	intent 41:15 56:22
84:2,15,21 85:4,5	10:22 11:8,11	91:1,5 93:9	indicating 67:1	intent 41.13 30.22
87:13,15,20	13:19 14:22	100:16 102:2	indicia 13:16,19	interest 53:12
88:10 89:1,3	16:18,19 18:16	103:12 104:4	individually 101:19	interested 26:3
90:14 91:15 92:6	19:16 20:21 21:6	III 2:18 3:12 5:14	indulgent 4:22	internal 12:5
92:21 93:1 97:14	22:16,21 23:16	5:16 7:19 8:4	inequity 13:20 14:3	internal 12.3
97:19 101:12	24:18 25:18,21	14:2,12 15:2,7,12	inevitably 80:5	103:10
103:3,9 104:12	26:14 27:1,17	15:14 16:13 23:9	information 3:20	interpretation
104:20	28:8 29:6,16	24:16 38:14	3:21 4:1,6,13	14:15 34:13
G&S's 17:16 23:2	30:17 31:1 36:3	39:11 41:19	16:11 29:13	39:15 58:18
52:16	43:1 44:8,21	51:22 52:10,15	54:15 71:2,7 83:4	104:17
32.10	47:17 48:10	53:15 59:4 73:22	initial 6:16 18:21	interpreted 14:11
<u> </u>	52:12 53:21	85:7 92:22 93:14	23:21 25:4 29:15	interpreting
half 22:21 25:22	54:19 56:4 66:15	103:13 104:4	37:9 56:15,17	103:12
53:2 96:16	67:5 75:1,7 87:12	III's 59:5 62:18	58:12,17 59:7	interrupt 14:5
hand 33:19 78:21	97:7 102:19	92:8	103:6	interstate 61:20
handle 45:14,16,22	105:9,17	II's 30:12 84:14	initially 41:19	inventory 34:14
handles 9:12	Honors 59:2 97:10	87:17 88:5,8 89:8	initiated 34:9	49:13
handling 21:14	hooking 21:21	92:13 93:12	inquiring 15:12	invested 105:19
35:5	hope 4:21	illusory 13:3	inquiring 15:12	investigate 88:15
hand-in-hand	hoping 82:12	illustrates 66:4	95:6	investigation 15:16
72:19	hours 50:16 78:4	impact 25:14	inspected 32:22	16:6,8 87:17,18
	96:16	implementation	34:2 53:18	91:2 93:13
happen 33:11		103:15		
happens 31:16	huge 77:16 hundred 31:20	implementing	inspection 12:2,10	investigations
48:14	hundred 31:20 hurdle 82:21	27:11 44:13	12:10,11 13:10	15:20 16:13
happy 6:22 11:1,11 75:6 88:2	hurry 96:2	implies 33:10	13:13 14:20 16:15 22:2 47:14	investigator 29:14
/3:0 00:2	Hully 90.2	miphes 33.10	10.13 22:2 47:14	30:13

			r	Page 11.
invidiously 11:6	job 41:17	39:21 66:10,16	50:4,8 51:13 52:5	83:10 89:22
invited 88:17	John 2:16 5:19	66:22 67:9 69:1	52:11,20 53:20	93:12
invocation 22:2	29:14 30:7 61:11	70:4,5,15,16,19	54:8,19 55:15	levels 9:12 84:5
involves 47:9	judge 1:16 3:3 5:9	76:3 94:21,22	56:3,6,9 57:11	license 22:16
involving 99:20	5:13,18,20 6:13	jump 11:1	58:22 71:10 97:7	licensed 22:14
in-hand 40:6	9:14 11:4 13:8	June 38:2 76:4,9	97:10 98:2,13	licenses 22:18
irreconcilable 92:9	14:5 18:7 19:13	jurisdiction 8:3	99:15,18 100:5	lieu 94:18
irrevocable 12:20	19:17 20:9,16	Justice 32:15 41:8	100:11,14 101:4	Light 2:4 93:5
issuance 93:18	21:3,10,16 23:6	43:10 97:17	101:9 102:10,16	limit 33:15 40:7
issue 11:2 14:21	24:5,7 25:14,19	103:2	102:19 104:1,11	42:11 64:6 80:10
18:15 24:8 26:17	26:2,8,12,15,19	justifiable 10:19	105:17	80:10
28:20 29:7 35:4	27:13 28:2,9,11	justifying 23:1		limitation 63:5
47:2,20 75:4	29:1 30:16 31:8		L	84:11
82:16 86:16	31:17,22 32:12	K	L 1:21 2:8	limitations 60:6
92:13 94:5	32:19 33:3 35:17	KATHIE 1:20	lab 58:8,13 96:10	limited 68:3,6
101:12 104:3,5,5	36:19 37:15 39:6	keep 31:12 32:8	96:21	78:17,18 84:3
issued 20:4 59:19	40:8,19 42:18,21	43:11	labels 67:12 69:20	limits 8:9,9,22
74:10 86:2 87:21	43:2 44:2,16 45:1	Keith 56:15	labor 56:16	59:18
95:16	47:1,15 48:1,6,12	Kelly 2:9 5:8	laboratory 58:2,6	lines 86:10
issues 3:14 4:16	49:1,5,22 50:5	key 44:7	lack 58:20 104:19	linked 60:7
6:20,20 33:5 59:6	51:11 52:3,9,13	keys 79:2	lading 85:1 93:4,7	liquid 84:4 101:18
62:9 70:6 88:19	53:13 54:6,9 55:9	kind 25:16 29:5	Laidley 2:10	liquids 18:1,1 91:8
issuing 93:15	55:16 56:5,8 57:8	32:16 40:21 50:9	language 10:7,16	list 42:5,13 47:3,6,7
item 65:1,21	58:22 62:11,15	52:22 55:1 74:19	11:5,11,15	47:8,10,12,19
items 60:16 64:10	63:18 64:1,14	kinds 43:5	large 8:15 29:11	63:11,13 64:1,21
64:21 65:10 66:2	65:3,6 66:7,10,12	knew 45:15 49:16	39:19 40:11	65:1 66:21 68:1,2
66:3 70:8 71:22	67:14,22 68:9	know 6:17 9:3	larger 95:22	68:6,12,14 69:14
72:14,15 77:20	69:5,13,21 70:3	27:18 31:2 32:16	largest 8:16 9:8	69:19,21 70:5
80:11 96:22	70:12,16,18,22	34:13 35:8 37:10	22:11 101:21	86:13
99:19 102:14	71:4,9 72:17 73:3	47:17 50:2 53:2	law 6:18 13:7 23:5	listed 65:10 68:22
	73:10,16,21 74:9	54:1 55:2 82:20	28:18	86:5,7,11
J	74:13 75:2,21	95:3 98:21	laws 7:21 19:12	lists 66:3 69:11
Jackson 2:9 5:8	77:10 78:14,20	101:11 104:4,5	23:4	96:13
Jamieson 2:15 5:15	79:4,11,14 80:4	104:14 105:13	lay 73:8	litigation 52:22
5:15,19 59:1,2,3	80:13 81:8,16	knowledge 19:21	leading 15:1	83:20
62:14,20 63:22	82:12,13,18 84:8	21:7 22:11 27:3	learning 105:20	little 12:6 18:10
64:7,15 65:5,8	84:13 86:15,18	73:19 74:3	leave 3:16 66:12	74:13
66:9,14 67:17	89:5,8,20 90:10	knowledgeable	leaves 73:10	located 8:2,14
68:5,11 69:9,18	90:22 91:4 92:8	30:1	leaving 87:20	location 46:22
70:1,5,15,17,21	92:16,20 93:11	known 3:8 38:3	led 95:7	logical 86:19
71:3,6,15 72:21	93:14 94:2 95:3	45:13	left 7:5,7 26:1	longer 45:9 95:14
73:5,13,19 74:5	95:10 96:6,20	knows 31:16	87:14 90:10,14	look 4:14 9:5 10:7
74:12,22 75:6	97:2,4,6,9,21	Kraft 84:2	legal 13:4 28:13	12:9 41:2 51:1,20
76:1 78:17 79:1,7	98:3 99:7,17	Kremer 34:9 41:21	29:5 53:3	75:4 85:20 87:1
79:21 80:9 81:3	100:2,8,12,22	46:19 94:15	legally 23:19	87:13 90:18
81:11 82:5,17	101:7 102:7,11	Kropp 2:8 5:8,12	legitimate 91:9	102:3
83:14 84:9,17	102:17 103:18	6:4,9 18:8,15	legitimately 23:19	looked 82:6,8
86:17 87:12 89:7	104:3,22 105:3	19:15 24:2 29:18	letter 17:17 25:1	looking 97:22 98:4
89:10 90:6,17	105:10,18	30:18,22 31:10	35:2,5,11 39:4	99:10 104:6
91:11 92:11,18	Judges 1:19 5:22	31:20 32:2,15,21	51:21 54:10,15	looks 17:16 103:19
93:2,17 94:3 95:9	18:14	33:5 36:2,22	100:16,20	loose 105:4
95:12 96:7 97:4,5	Judge's 28:18	37:19 39:14	letters 54:21	losing 31:3
97:11 105:9	90:18	40:13 41:8 42:20	let's 87:13 100:9	lost 8:5
January 105:12,12	judgment 13:2,7	43:1,10 44:6,21	105:10,10	lot 27:13
105:16	15:22	45:6 47:7,16 48:5	level 7:9 14:10	lots 84:22 91:12,18
Jersey 8:14	July 38:6,14,22	48:10,19 49:4,12	15:18 25:10 66:1	lower 93:12

Page 114

	<u> </u>	т		Tage 11
M	meant 45:14	50:12	68:14 69:19,21	76:3 78:4 91:8
mails 15:13	mechanism 26:16	morning 3:3,4,18	number 16:5 34:5	operate 8:19 20:6
main 29:7	38:4 40:16 62:17	4:15 5:5,11,22	38:20 65:21	23:22 24:22 25:5
maintain 21:10	95:7	29:8 59:2 105:22	66:13 69:6	53:3 99:16
26:16	meet 61:1 62:6	morning's 105:19	numbers 66:22	operates 27:4
maintained 34:16	meetings 13:22	motion 3:12	69:14 96:8,10,20	50:13 60:15
96:16	Mega 45:12	move 75:9	96:21,22	104:12
maintenance 32:14	Mega-rule 38:3	MSC 41:15,20	numerous 17:2	operating 60:20
making 15:10	45:19	42:10 43:19		77:11 79:19
74:17	memo 12:5 95:13	MSCs 33:22 57:7	0	80:14,16 89:3
Manager 90:13	95:13	multiple 37:5,6	O 3:1	90:14 95:8
manifest 45:2,6	memorandum 95:17	50:14	obligation 43:6,13	operation 27:5
46:6,14 65:20		N	45:20 101:17	88:22
76:2,13,22,22	memory 88:1 memos 15:21	N 3:1	obligations 26:19 97:20 101:1	operations 7:14
86:8 93:6	mentioned 9:4	name 6:2 42:5,12	observed 28:22	23:2 24:20 27:3
manifested 21:1	21:18 43:2	68:1	obtained 39:10	opinion 18:18,21
manifests 27:20	merely 18:20	narrowing 3:14	obvious 84:19	90:19
35:21 36:8 69:2	met 13:22	national 19:10	obviously 20:13	opportunity 28:15 57:16 105:21
85:22 86:4 manner 7:11	metal 18:3 28:5	nature 23:3 35:19	36:15 83:5 86:22	opposed 24:15 48:6
Marian 2:2 5:6 6:3	32:4 50:14 55:22	necessarily 62:17	99:12	option 46:18
market 20:14	59:12 60:15 61:9	90:13	occasions 61:3	oral 1:12,14 4:19
match 96:10	61:14,17 72:15	necessary 4:9 5:17	occur 16:2 102:18	5:16 69:7,9 106:7
matched 96:20	76:20 77:9 79:12	41:1,6	occurred 19:21	order 3:5,6 4:10
matches 96:21	82:4 97:1	necessitated 60:12	90:7 93:13 94:22	6:16 18:22 23:21
material 38:16	microphone 64:13	need 7:9,9 27:14	95:1	25:4 29:15 43:8
69:11 78:21 80:6	mid 31:3	40:4 45:5 49:14	occurring 93:11	45:5 49:12 88:15
85:10 86:12	midnight 50:17	52:6,17 57:19	October 3:5	99:18
101:8	midst 25:16	97:15 102:5	odd 74:13 84:12	ordinarily 28:22
materials 39:20	mike 65:4	104:18	offer 95:5	original 39:19
45:10 55:11,17	Miles 2:3 5:6	needed 46:13	office 2:19 61:12	ought 49:20
65:15 81:7,9	million 35:8 36:15	never 16:13 20:2	64:20 69:12	outdated 20:15
matter 3:13 6:6	44:18 53:2,2	21:8 32:21 38:22	Officer 61:13 62:5	outgoing 76:22
10:18 11:2 13:7	60:17 64:11 66:1	43:20,21,22	66:20 70:11	outlined 15:17
15:12 16:2 18:18	66:6 67:13 71:5	44:15 45:9 54:5	Officer's 62:2	outside 8:20 72:18
18:20 19:12	72:16 77:5	57:16 70:13 86:7	Offices 90:2	80:16,22 83:9
39:14 51:15	mind 62:18 minimis 84:16	new 8:14 49:17	official 15:8,11,13	oven 48:15 49:10
56:20 106:2	minimum 96:15	nine 78:4 non 91:9	officials 13:22 15:2	50:15 55:22
matters 6:11 21:14	minute 16:16 41:10	non-liquid 84:4	15:3 88:8 offsite 77:8	59:12 60:15,20
maximum 33:12,14	minutes 3:7,10 6:8	normal 77:14,20	oh 39:4 102:4	72:15 76:20 77:9 79:12 82:4 96:11
33:18 35:14 38:1 56:19 57:13	6:10,12	79:2	oil 60:5 85:13	79:12 82:4 96:11 97:1
68:18	misfiled 93:6	note 50:10 67:11	oil-filled 9:9	overarching 48:7
McPhilliamy 63:7	misplaced 67:5	noted 62:3	okay 5:13,20 19:13	override 101:2
67:9 71:11	missed 75:7 82:15	notice 1:15 58:20	19:15 21:16 24:5	104:9
McPhilliamy's	92:18	104:5	28:9 30:16 33:3	oversight 27:18
64:16	misstatement 55:8	notification 37:1	49:4 53:6,9 79:5	overview 59:4
MD 2:5	mobile 94:8	37:13 38:13,14	79:14 96:6 97:9	overwhelming
mean 13:11 48:2	models 83:18	39:1,5 40:3,3,6	99:17 100:11	25:12
49:6 50:1 53:1	modification 39:12	42:2,7,15	102:10 105:3,18	over-broad 91:2
73:2 80:6 84:8	39:16,18	notified 39:21	once 36:9 46:1	owned 33:17 34:12
99:12 100:12	modify 38:12	41:14 42:1,10	56:11 75:13	44:19 51:2 53:18
101:2 103:1	moment 6:19 49:3	notify 38:13 40:16	ones 85:13	54:13 70:7 71:14
means 74:11,21	89:12	notion 87:4	one-day 78:1,3	99:10
102:12	money 38:15 53:7	November 63:17	onsite 9:11,13	owner 34:19,22
	months 16:12 50:7	64:16 66:7,9	36:10 44:5,9,10	35:18 44:11
	And the state of t			

				Page 113
46:10 51:17	73:18 75:20	Pesticides 61:12	95:16	problem 55:2
72:19 73:1,3,5,8	pay 31:6,9,11	Philadelphia 2:21	positions 20:5	104:16
73:17 99:4,12,13	payload 26:20	photograph 67:8	93:20	problems 94:16
100:6,9	PCB 7:10,16 8:16	67:15,16	possession 34:20	procedure 27:11
ownership 45:4	9:12 17:5,8,15,21	physical 39:17,22	100:6	procedures 24:4
47:2 49:2 53:13	18:4 20:11,14	72:2	possible 53:22	proceed 3:4,9 33:4
71:10,12,16	25:13 26:6 27:20	physically 56:14	possibly 102:2	proceeding 3:9
72:17 73:17 74:2	29:9 30:3,4 33:7	pick 46:11 51:15,17	103:14 105:5	37:16 84:15
74:11,15 97:18	33:11,16 34:2,9	101:10	potentially 87:4,5	process 40:20
98:1,6 105:6	38:3 40:12 41:17	picked 33:20	pound 64:6	71:20 81:2 93:15
owns 34:14 43:21	42:9,20 44:17	picks 34:18 98:19	pounds 34:6 38:16	101:7 102:13
47:22	46:9 47:15,18	picture 67:8	40:7 41:16 42:3,6	103:21
	48:16 53:17	piece 33:10,16	42:9,11,18 63:5	processed 51:5
P	56:11,13 59:8,10	35:16 43:11	68:18 76:7 80:12	78:1,2
P 3:1	59:17,22 60:4,11	45:14 46:4 48:20	80:12 85:17	processes 44:13
PA 2:21	60:15,17 63:2,4,9	48:22 52:8 57:12	Power 76:15 93:5	81:9
PAD 65:1	63:13,20 64:2,3	58:11	PPM 18:4 64:3	processing 33:22
PADS 65:11	64:19 66:4,18,21	pieces 43:17,18	66:1	50:21 55:12
pad-mounted 65:1	67:10,12,22 68:1	46:8	practical 16:1	75:15 77:21 78:6
65:11	68:4,6,17 69:7,16	place 12:3 66:17	25:14	78:11 79:5,8,15
page 10:17 11:9	71:2 76:7 77:5	80:11 84:12 88:6	preamble 82:7,9,11	79:22 80:1,2,6,7
36:5 63:7 79:15	85:8,9 88:9 91:8	89:14,15	precisely 7:6	80:8 81:8,19,21
pages 12:7,8 36:4	91:18,22 92:1	Plaintiff's 9:6	predicated 58:12	81:22 82:7,9
98:1	95:15 98:15	plan 8:10 9:1 21:12	preferring 3:16	processor 81:13
paid 60:12 72:9	99:19,20 100:3	38:6,12 60:8	premise 10:3,17	produces 71:20
panoply 8:11	100:21 101:11,14	plans 16:14	12:11 16:8 91:9	101:7 102:13
paperwork 31:12	102:12,14 104:14	play 53:10	premised 49:1	products 61:19
36:11	PCBs 44:18 55:13	playing 7:9 14:10	prepared 4:17 12:5	Program 90:12
pardon 82:15	61:14,18 71:20	please 4:6 6:2 75:5	present 6:19 28:15	programs 37:3
part 5:10 8:7 12:7	71:22 72:2,3 84:5	105:8	59:4 76:1	prohibit 101:14
14:8 20:5,10 21:4	102:13,14	pleasure 6:22	presented 4:16,21	prohibits 55:12
21:11 24:16 35:2	PCB-contaminated	plenty 13:18 87:8	101:22	promulgated 38:2
37:13 38:1 44:1	18:2 59:13 61:2	PLLC 2:9	presenting 5:10,16	proof 57:9 89:20
65:14 71:21 80:5	64:4	point 7:15 18:8	presently 50:1	proper 6:21
98:14 99:11	penalty 58:11,19	35:22 38:20 46:2	preserve 4:11	proportion 71:13
particles 20:11	people 33:7 87:10	47:1 48:19 50:2	President 35:19	prosecute 10:13
particular 11:19	period 78:1,3,16	51:18 62:15 75:5	56:16 72:6	11:18 14:18
24:12 53:15	80:5	76:21 77:6 86:6	presiding 1:17	prosecuting 24:11
78:20 80:9,15	permissible 58:19	89:18 90:5 91:13	61:13 62:2,5	prosecution 10:20
83:3 103:19	permit 8:8,9 43:9	100:18	66:20 70:11	14:16,19 18:10
particularly 25:22	54:13 57:7 80:10	pointing 41:20	presumably 64:5	18:11 22:3 24:10
98:5	83:1,2,4 93:19	point-by-point	presume 26:7	24:13 28:13 74:7
parties 3:17,19,22	102:6	90:20 POLE 65:2	pretext 13:10,15	82:16,20 83:11
4:15 15:19	permitted 22:15	POLE 65:2	pretextual 13:3	86:16 87:7
parts 35:8 36:14	73:15	POLES 65:11	prevail 7:2 19:4	Protection 1:2,7
44:18 60:17	person 11:19 35:12	pole-mounted 65:2	prevent 60:11	2:17 6:5 76:16
64:11 66:1,5	71:20 72:22 73:6	65:12	Prevention 61:12	prove 9:20 43:8
67:13 71:5 72:15	88:9,12,13 95:12 101:5 102:12	policy 90:5,7 94:13 94:16,18	prima 62:9,13,21 75:10	57:10 62:22
77:5		94:16,18 portion 29:11	, •	74:14
parts-per-million	persons 61:21	. -	primarily 72:8	provide 24:19 60:9
51:7	79:18	54:14	primary 4:18 20:7	provided 29:13
party 10:12 83:20	person's 73:8	position 18:17	26:17 31:17	35:20 57:16
91:16 101:1 passage 45:12	perspective 6:21 perspectives 4:16	37:17,19 38:18	61:15	63:11 68:13
passage 43:12 patience 106:1	perspectives 4:16 pertain 68:3	40:2 49:12 70:22 78:11 81:3,19	prioritize 3:17	provides 9:10
Pause 11:12 67:4,7	per-million 20:17	87:19 93:21 94:4	probably 27:14 81:13	providing 7:16 proving 57:12
1 4430 11.12 07.7,7	Per-minon 20.17		01.13	Proving 37.12

				Page 110
provision 32:13	R 3:1	recording 89:14	90:1	repeated 14:2
48:8	RA 40:22	records 21:7	regions 7:19,19	repeatedly 28:21
punitive 16:4	race 11:20	recovery 50:15	87:5	replete 37:4
purchase 85:3 91:6	raised 42:11 62:9	59:12 60:15 97:1	Region's 38:18	report 49:17 90:12
91:12,17	62:18 70:6 88:19	recycling 61:10	78:11 87:19 94:3	Reporter 65:7
purchased 91:22	91:13 101:12	reduced 69:8	regs 24:19 25:2	represent 6:4
purchases 84:22	random 60:20	Reed 56:15	regulate 22:1 23:8	represented 47:6
85:5	rationales 16:5	refer 4:1,5 100:15	23:9,11 24:15	58:8 84:14
pure 56:13	RCRA 103:20	reference 68:1	regulated 8:7 10:12	representing 83:16
purport 47:6	reach 91:3	85:22	13:13 17:10	85:16
purportedly 7:20	reaching 7:21	referenced 100:4	18:19,20 19:3,4	request 3:16 6:15
purporting 20:17	reaction 91:5	references 19:19	22:8 24:17 25:6	16:11,17 44:3,7
purpose 15:20,21	read 38:11 40:13	refute 36:1	27:4,22 28:3	58:17 62:16
82:14	57:22 96:17 99:2	regard 62:21 66:16	46:12 71:20 84:5	64:16 69:6,8,16
purposes 3:14 9:17	reading 102:11	67:3 75:9,15,16	86:20 90:2,4	70:7 71:1,1
30:4 100:10	reads 79:15	77:21 83:15 86:7	97:15 102:13	requested 13:21
104:7	really 23:7 28:18	90:21 93:18	regulating 92:22	41:16 68:10,11
pursuant 1:14	52:17 78:14	regarding 12:12	regulation 32:20	70:13
purview 8:20	80:17,21 86:12	32:13 43:11	32:20 38:17	requesting 3:13
put 6:20 16:13	88:20	57:20 71:2 95:6	40:13,18,19	requests 69:9
31:14 45:21	realm 80:22 89:4	regardless 30:8	41:12 61:14	require 79:17 84:3
48:14 77:7 83:21	reason 12:2,9 31:8	48:13	91:10 103:22	89:4
84:12	31:10 53:6 70:8	regards 77:12	regulations 7:10,21	required 32:6 36:8
putting 33:15	reasonable 54:9,16	regimes 48:4	12:17,18 14:11	39:12 40:3 44:14
37:22 47:2 49:2	70:11 91:2	region 2:18 3:12	23:18,21 25:1	46:5 92:15
68:16 75:22	reasons 6:14 16:5	5:13,16 8:3,15	30:1 34:11 50:9	requirement 39:7
P.C 2:3	38:20	13:22 14:2,11,12	58:19 72:20	41:3 45:9,10 56:2
p.m 106:7	rebuttal 3:11 6:12	15:2,3,7,7,8,11	73:16 74:18	56:22 61:6 72:1
P.O 2:11	97:8	15:12,13,13	101:13 103:10	99:5
Q	recall 47:8 90:6	16:13 20:5 23:2,9	regulatory 9:17	requirements 8:11
qualify 99:8	94:1	23:11,16 24:15	12:17 19:18,22	12:17,18 24:20
quantities 85:8	receipt 65:18 receive 17:14 20:22	24:16 25:7,9,11 30:5,12 35:3,4,11	24:9 26:10,13 27:18 30:3 32:13	27:19 28:2,5 30:2 39:8 48:18 53:19
95:21	41:16 42:2 91:18	35:17 38:14,19	37:3 43:13 48:4,8	57:3 59:9,12
quantity 60:4,6	received 3:12 65:21	39:10 41:19	52:15,16 61:1	91:20 102:15
62:19	69:13 71:7,8 76:5	51:21,21,22	74:15 80:17 92:9	requires 88:21
question 4:3,7 9:14	76:18 89:2 92:1	52:10,15,19	101:3,4 104:9	resale 20:8,10,19
11:1,3 13:14	98:10	53:15 59:4,5,16	reject 39:5	20:21 21:4,9,11
26:21 28:11	receives 65:15	62:18 73:22	relate 24:3	25:7 30:19,20
30:19 37:16	receiving 17:9	77:10 83:13,14	related 72:18	31:1 91:6
39:14 43:21 44:8	25:13 69:2	83:21 84:13,21	relates 24:10 29:8	resell 20:18
45:7 47:11 49:19	recognize 53:10	85:7 87:2,17,22	relating 29:1	reserve 3:10 6:12
52:20 69:19	recognized 25:3	88:4,5,5,7,14,16	release 12:13,14	41:10
70:19 82:14	38:7	88:17,17,19,22	13:2,4 16:1	resold 35:9 36:15
92:18,21 95:4	record 3:21 5:3 9:6	89:8,9,15 90:13	religion 11:20	resolve 87:7 89:22
97:21 100:21	10:1 12:15 17:11	90:18,19,21 91:1	rely 10:7 98:3	respect 3:21 14:3
105:5	19:19 33:2 35:22	91:5 92:5,8,13,21	relying 21:6 74:14	14:22 22:7,10
questions 4:22 7:1	36:2,4,6 41:22	92:22 93:8,9,10	remarks 4:17	23:1,16 44:17
18:12,14 19:14	42:21 50:10 55:5	93:12,14 96:19	remove 98:18	81:6 92:5 97:11
24:6 29:1 30:18	57:21 58:14 62:1	100:16 102:2	removed 18:5 33:8	respectfully 6:15
44:15 97:2 105:1	68:8 72:5 75:19	103:1,3,8,9,11,12	50:22 65:20 76:4	respond 11:3
106:1	76:11,14 83:7,17	103:13 104:4,4,4	76:10 88:14	responded 38:22
quote 11:10 40:22	83:21 85:18	105:4	98:17 99:9,21	41:9 44:3
quoted 61:13	86:22 87:13,21	Regional 2:19	repackage 51:8	Respondent 62:22
R	88:2 89:11 91:15	39:12 40:17 41:1	repair 92:3	72:9 76:5,12
	91:21 94:12,14	41:6 59:19 60:1	repeat 65:8	77:19

·	<u> </u>	т	 _	rage II
Respondent's	saying 30:5 32:22	send 44:2,6,7	7:15 8:14 66:17	state 81:12 90:21
17:20 67:1 72:6	39:4 40:9 49:2	sending 26:5 72:13	similarity 7:18	stated 82:7 91:16
76:20 94:6	55:19 70:13 73:4	77:18	Similarly 77:21	statement 53:20
response 54:10	74:16 99:8	sense 28:19 90:14	similarly-situated	74:20 79:14
63:17 64:12,15	103:13	sent 35:5,11 38:13	7:4,7 83:6	80:19
89:8 97:3 105:2	says 34:19,21 40:15	39:4 42:1,7 47:3	simply 21:4 34:3	states 1:2 8:17 9:8
105:13,14,15	40:18 41:12	47:8 61:9 77:3	39:22 47:18	11:10 22:12,13
responsive 4:22	43:13,16 44:22	85:1	56:18 98:19 99:1	85:5 90:20 102:1
rest 22:17	49:17 51:15,17	separate 104:5	single 43:11	status 15:14 19:18
result 103:8	51:21 74:15	September 34:10	singling 10:12	19:22 24:9 52:15
resulting 7:22	97:14 98:16	35:11 46:19	sit 47:22 49:7,10	52:16
results 58:8 77:4	99:12 100:6,16	51:20 58:1 94:20	50:6	Stein 1:20 6:1 9:14
reversed 6:16	scenario 26:13	100:15,20	site 41:17 44:19	13:8 24:7 43:2,10
58:17	53:15 89:12 90:8	sequence 95:1	sitting 49:21	44:2 54:9 73:16
review 29:16 93:2	90:9	serial 96:9	situation 66:17	73:21 74:9,13
reviewed 6:17	scenarios 92:10	series 89:13	six 96:20	
60:19 93:4 95:17	schedule 16:14	serious 12:12	six-digit 96:21	75:2,21 82:12,18
re-manifest 46:16	scheme 46:8	seriously 20:12	slightly 63:10	86:15,18 97:17 98:3 100:22
			signtly 05.10 small 8:2 61:16	
re-manifested	scope 8:20 Scott 1:16 58:1	service 18:5 33:8 76:4,10 85:2 92:2		101:7 102:7,11
36:10 46:20		76:4,10 85:2 92:2 98:19	105:3	102:17 103:18
RFS 65:18	67:9	98:19 services 1:8 3:8 6:5	Smith 30:7 45:20	104:3
Rice 58:2 63:8	scrap 28:5 32:4		61:11	stems 24:14
right 5:21 10:16	48:15 49:9 50:14	7:16,17 9:11	Smithfield 10:8,9	Stockbridge 2:3
13:4 19:13 20:18	55:22 59:11	35:20 76:16	10:10,17 11:5,8	5:6
27:14 41:10	60:15 61:9 72:14	servicing 33:20	Smith's 30:15	storage 8:8,9,21
42:14 56:5,8 70:3	76:20 77:9 79:12	98:17 99:9,22,22	snapshot 60:19	17:10 19:20 20:2
78:12,22 80:8	82:4 96:22	set 6:14 7:10 10:1	sole 13:14	21:2 22:1,9 23:10
86:17 90:10	second 11:1,1 14:6	18:11 23:4,5	somebody 33:20	23:12 28:4 33:6
100:5 101:9	33:15 47:3 59:11	24:12 54:15	somewhat 83:5	33:12,14,17,18
103:3 104:22	91:13	56:22	87:2 104:5	35:14,15 37:10
rigs 94:9	Secondly 29:16	setting 28:14 31:22	sorry 9:7 15:10	38:1 40:5 41:20
rise 106:6	section 17:8 63:16	shadow 17:19	17:18 65:5,8	43:4 44:14 47:13
rises 83:10	96:18 98:4	share 11:11	66:12 67:5 92:19	48:17 50:6,20,22
roles 37:6	see 18:13 21:20	shift 26:4 50:17	sort 28:12 78:14,15	51:1 52:7,18 53:4
room 18:18	23:13 58:2 63:15	ship 46:21	95:3 101:2	53:5,8,19 54:2
routine 16:15	65:10,13,18 66:1	shipped 45:11	sought 52:9 83:1	55:6 56:2 57:3,13
rub 31:17	66:2,18 67:10,14	56:10 57:5 70:9	so-called 44:17	59:10,17,18 60:5
rubric 24:13 37:18	68:22 81:16	shipping 17:4	speak 27:1 85:21	63:1,3,5,10,14
Ruggero 2:16 5:19	88:15 92:9	shop 43:12	special 16:16	64:10,10,19,21
rule 45:13,13,18	seek 41:3 89:2	short 59:14 96:15	specific 12:16	65:20 66:19
rules 24:3 53:10	seeking 19:11	shortly 76:5	22:22	67:11 68:4,19
run 96:15	23:19 94:17	show 7:3 34:4 63:6	specifically 10:9,11	70:1 72:1,10
running 18:10	seen 32:21	63:17 64:8,9	39:11	78:13 79:18,19
50:17	segregate 43:7,14	76:12,17 94:12	specified 3:6	79:20,21,22 80:3
rush 12:13,14 13:2	selected 10:9 60:21	94:14 96:12 98:9	speeding 46:4	80:5,7,11,21 81:1
13:6 15:22	selective 6:9 7:3	showed 60:22	spelled 54:17	81:2 82:2 84:4
	9:18 14:16 18:10	shown 10:13	standard 10:19	85:12 89:3 91:20
S	18:11 19:5 24:10	shows 75:19 76:2,7	11:20 22:20	93:16,19 97:15
S 3:1	24:13 28:13 62:4	76:14 78:9 91:21	28:13 61:6,7	97:19 99:5,20
safety 18:2 72:14	74:7 82:16,19	side 3:6 8:1,13	standards 10:14	100:3 101:17
sake 90:2	83:11 86:16 87:7	sides 95:1	30:3 61:2 85:14	102:6 103:5
Samples 77:3	self 27:10 44:12	sign 46:11	standpoint 26:22	104:7,19
sampling 77:4,17	self-implementing	signed 45:7	starred 66:2	store 33:7 50:8
satisfied 10:2 12:16	24:3 49:18	significantly 38:10	start 10:3 61:17	52:4,8 56:21
91:1 93:12	sell 36:17	signs 45:7	started 39:3 42:17	59:21 69:3 78:12
saw 3:17 49:11	selling 101:14	similar 7:13,14,15	starting 5:3	101:17
•				

				Page 118
stored 37:21 40:12	supervisor 84:1	tension 26:22 28:1	three 17:12 18:1	68:3,6,19 69:7
50:11,20 60:5,7	supplied 64:9	term 60:19 73:17	50:11 57:20	71:2,13 72:11
62:19 67:18 76:8	support 25:8,11	74:15,18,21	59:16 60:14,20	85:9 101:18
storer 33:11 36:21	supported 48:11	terminated 12:21	61:4,22 62:10	102:4
37:1,7,14,18 39:9	supporting 62:1	72:4	87:4,5 96:9	transport 37:7 46:1
48:21 65:22	supports 58:14	terms 11:13 40:20	tied 94:10	46:8
68:17 73:14	suppose 92:21	43:4,9 54:12 73:8	till 4:8	transportation
75:12 84:2,10,15	supposedly 104:13	90:4 94:16 98:5,5	time 3:10,18 4:9	31:18 51:5 77:15
85:8 88:20 90:16	sure 29:17 50:4,8	104:9	18:8,11 19:14	77:20 78:8 79:3
92:7,12 98:8,15	53:14 54:8 83:11	test 30:8 35:7 45:10	46:10,15 48:15	79:13 82:2
99:6,13,19	89:17 102:9	45:20 46:2,12	50:15,16,19 51:6	transported 46:6
stores 98:15	103:9,18	52:1	51:15 56:17	46:13
storing 59:10 75:17	surfaces 61:14,17	tested 30:6 36:14	59:12,14 61:1,5,7	transporter 31:12
80:10 85:11	61:20	51:16 56:12 77:2	63:1,3 69:15,15	86:8,11,13
95:20	surplus 17:18 20:8	testified 28:17	70:19,19,21 74:3	transporters 86:10
Street 2:4,20	25:7,11 84:22	34:10 46:19	76:21 78:1,3,16	transporting 46:17
stricken 58:20	85:5 91:12,22	61:11 93:3	84:5 88:1 91:9	treated 9:16 16:21
strikes 13:11	101:13 104:13	testimony 17:12	95:13,16 96:14	90:16
string 25:9	sustain 62:6	29:17,19 30:4,7	101:18 102:20	treating 91:6
struggling 14:6	swept 81:1	30:10,11,15	104:20,21	treatment 10:4
stuff 39:22 51:8	swing 65:3	35:19 37:4,5	times 96:14	94:9
subject 8:8,10,22	switching 31:5	41:22 45:21	today 8:15 85:6	trial 29:1 37:4
11:17 19:1,2,6	system 27:8 65:14	48:11 68:7 69:5	95:2	42:17
21:1 22:18 32:12	65:16 67:2 69:1	72:5 76:17 78:9	told 53:16,22 54:3	tribunal 56:18
32:19 36:20	72:7 83:9	85:4 88:12 89:10	55:20 57:19	103:6
43:19 48:17	72.7 03.5	89:19 91:21	68:18 71:12 83:8	trouble 14:15
53:19 57:2,7 60:1		95:18 103:7	97:12	87:10
62:22 71:22 72:4	T 64:22 65:11	testing 18:4 34:22	topic 18:12	troubled 82:21
87:15,17 91:19	tagged 27:7	35:12 51:19 99:4	torn 78:3	86:18 88:21
102:15 103:22	take 6:19,22 30:10	100:15,17	toto 83:4	troubling 24:18
subjects 18:9	43:2 87:1 100:6	thank 6:13 18:16	Tower 2:10	25:6 83:12
submit 19:3 75:6	106:3	19:16 30:16,17	Toxic 61:12	trucking 31:13
submitted 17:11,17	taken 11:6 67:8,10	33:3 58:21,22	to-grave 65:16	true 19:7 83:20
105:7	77:3	97:1,4 104:20	trail 15:1,6	truly 81:11
submitting 105:5	talk 23:6 31:1 36:6	105:17,18 106:5	transaction 80:15	trust 4:18 12:13,14
Subpart 71:21 72:1	talked 37:22 56:16	theme 14:3	transcript 63:6,15	12:15,16,20,20
subpoenaed 58:6	talking 20:14 33:13	themes 14:3	66:19 84:6	12:22 13:3,5
Subsection 56:1	70:3 71:10 78:16	theory 53:13 71:10	transfer 75:14	31:21 38:6,7,9,15
subsequent 50:2	82:22	thing 32:17 92:4	77:11 79:4 81:4,6	53:7
69:15 77:18	talks 38:11	93:9	86:7	try 16:5
subsequently 48:14	taxpayers 60:13	things 9:20 27:13	transferring 77:13	trying 11:9 24:22
Substances 61:12	tearing 77:16 78:6	29:6 87:5,9 91:14	86:12	49:6 94:12
substantial 71:13	79:10	102:17 104:17	transformer 31:15	TSCA 1:6 7:10
substantially 38:8	technically 82:19	think 11:2 33:1	49:15 64:22 65:1	59:18 63:1 79:17
substantiatry 50:5	Technologies 88:10	36:4 42:14 45:6	65:2,20	79:19 94:8
substantive 6:11	tell 43:17,18 75:5	52:11,13,20 55:2	transformers 31:7	TSCA-03-2001-0
substitute 94:13	tells 65:16	57:11 66:4 71:9	44:4,9,10,17,19	1:9
suddenly 42:5	temperature 32:13	74:16,18 82:20	47:4,12,15,18,19	turning 18:15
100:13	59:12 61:1,5,7	98:13 102:20,21	47:22 48:13,16	turns 28:18 46:12
suffers 25:16	96:14,15	103:2,4 104:1,3	48:17 49:5,7	51:4
sufficiently 39:19	temperatures	thought 39:11 58:7	51:12 53:17	two 6:7 7:13,19
61:15 66:4	61:17	58:9 84:11 95:11	54:14 55:20,22	9:16 10:4 14:7
suggest 29:4	ten 8:18 13:19	98:9 105:4	63:3,4,9,13,21	20:6 24:9 29:6
suggesting 27:15	22:20 25:22	thoughts 106:4	64:2,3,4,22 65:10	34:1 39:2 43:7
80:20 103:19	56:19 57:2,5	thousand 31:21	65:11,12 66:18	47:5,8,9 50:7
suggests 13:9	78:22 85:15	thousands 85:16	67:2,11,12,13	51:10 56:6 57:9
345Beam 13.7	70.22 03.13		07.2,11,12,13	31.10 30.0 37.9
THE PROPERTY OF THE PERSON OF THE PERSON NAMED IN THE PERSON NAM		CONTRACTOR	Promote mentioned by Communication Communication and Communication Commu	A STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE

				Page II
59:8,17 62:10	49:20 66:22	violators 7:4 10:4	week 39:3 42:16	wrap 18:13 57:19
64:8 75:9 79:22	United 1:2 8:17	Virginia 8:3 94:6	105:11,15	wrapping 18:17
83:17 85:10	22:12,13 102:1	virtually 9:2	weeks 60:21 61:4	Wright 96:3
86:10 87:22 90:1	units 18:2,4 20:21	virtue 74:2	weight 39:20	writing 69:8
91:14 94:8 96:16	20:22 54:2 64:10	vis 13:20,20 30:11	weights 34:5 47:13	written 41:3,4 44:3
98:22	64:19 67:22 68:1	30:12	63:4 66:22 67:2	44:6
two-chamber	68:2 69:17 70:14	volatilize 61:18	68:2 69:7,15	wrote 95:12
32:17	70:18		welcome 3:3 97:5	WV 2:12
		volatilized 61:15		W V 2:12
two-page 12:6	universe 20:17	Volume 63:6 84:6	went 60:18 66:17	<u> </u>
type 7:16	unjustifiable 10:14	volumes 38:10	67:20 88:7 89:1	
types 59:8 85:10,15	11:19	V's 103:8	95:15	x 1:5,10
86:2 87:22 91:14	unregulated 9:2		weren't 50:17	XII 84:6
	45:17 74:2 91:7	W	80:17 82:1 100:3	
U	untested 46:9	wait 41:9	West 8:3 94:6	Y
ultimate 47:21 49:8	untouched 7:5,8	waiting 49:21	we'll 18:13 19:13	year 50:10 78:18
52:2	87:14,20	walk 102:3,8	we're 18:10 20:14	78:19
ultimately 16:6	unusual 88:6	walked 34:3	28:14 32:7 33:13	years 8:5,18 9:5
20:4	upheld 66:20	walks 43:16	34:21 46:17	13:20,21 16:12
umbrella 48:7	usable 101:10	want 18:7 28:10	52:11,14 53:11	20:3 22:21,21
un 20:22	use 31:11 36:7 72:3	31:14 53:6,7	68:15 78:16	25:22 28:21 53:1
unambiguously	uses 36:3 38:17	86:15 96:1 102:7	82:22 83:8,8 87:6	yellow 67:11
40:21	utilities 17:3,4	wanted 16:4 21:19	102:21	
unclear 98:14	100:4	55:9 68:18	we've 34:16 42:1	\$_
102:22 103:17	utility 8:6 26:1 72:8	warning 38:21	44:10 53:1 55:2	\$200,000 96:2
undated 12:5	98:11 100:13	58:21 103:14	whatsoever 25:6	
undergirded 54:7	70.22 23332	warranted 105:13	Wheeling 69:12	0
underlying 10:3	$\overline{\mathbf{v}}$	WASHINGTON	94:6	03 46:19
12:2,9,10,11	V 87:2 88:4,5,17,19	1:3	wishes 3:11 7:1	06-01 1:7
15:20 16:8	89:9 90:13,19	wasn't 81:20 90:12	witness 48:11 58:1	
understand 14:14	103:1,3,9,11	waste 7:17 8:16	witnesses 28:16,19	1
21:1,19 24:10	104:4	17:5,6,15 22:12	29:2,17,19,22	1,000 80:11
26:3 40:8 50:1,7	value 4:19	25:13 26:6 27:20	30:10 34:8 37:5,5	10 2:4 36:8
52:15 53:14 55:9	various 10:1 17:2	29:9 30:3,6,8	83:22	10th 34:11 46:19
55:18 70:12 80:4	90:21 96:13	31:11 35:7,10	Wolgast 1:21 5:22	58:1
81:17 84:14	vastly 7:21	36:7,9 38:10	14:5 35:17 36:19	10:30 1:15 3:2
87:12 90:11	vehicle 91:6	40:12 41:17 42:9	37:15 39:6 40:8	100,000 38:16
92:16 99:8 102:9		42:13,19,20 43:3		41:16 42:2,11
	veracity 28:19 verifiable 58:4	43:5,7 46:4,6,13	42:18 47:1,15	1019 12:8
103:11 106:2			48:1,12 49:1,5,22	1019 12:8 1020 12:8
understanding	versus 25:4	59:10,22 60:4,7	50:5 51:11 55:9	11 78:5,22
3:22 4:20 5:9	videotapes 88:11	60:11 62:19	55:16 56:5,8 57:8	11 /8:5,22 11/22/1999 64:19
19:18 20:1 26:3	view 21:3,22 22:5	68:17 69:2,3 72:9	62:11 63:18 64:1	
30:21 32:9 73:2	24:1 29:19 30:15	75:13,15,16	64:14 66:12 69:5	12 6:8,10 66:14
84:17 98:6	41:2 52:10,17,19	77:14 85:8,19	69:13,21 70:3,12	100:16
understands 103:9	68:2,5 73:12,13	94:10 95:20	70:16,18 81:16	12th 51:20 105:15
understood 81:17	84:14 87:2 90:1	98:10,15 99:6,20	97:21 99:7,17	12:40 106:7
undertake 80:22	90:11 92:8,11	100:3,18 102:12	100:2,8,12	13 1:15
undertaken 27:16	viewed 23:12 68:12	wastes 33:7 98:16	wondering 24:11	13,000 36:3
32:3	viewing 73:20	100:21	word 38:17 78:15	14,000 36:4
under-5-parts	violated 59:8	way 15:4 35:21	96:8	144 84:7
20:16	violation 16:6	36:9 39:5 53:11	wording 40:9	15 22:21 66:22 67:9
unfairly 24:11	33:14 34:7 46:4	65:6 67:18 99:14	words 16:7 90:3	16 61:3
unfettered 25:5	78:13 85:13	101:11 103:12	workers 50:21	16-A 96:12
uniform 7:11	96:14	104:12,17	works 53:15	16-C 96:11
uniformity 19:10	violations 59:9	wearing 102:2	worth 31:21 53:2	1600 2:10
unique 90:8	70:2 87:22	Webb 14:1	wouldn't 40:11	1650 2:20
unit 31:14 46:22		1 T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T		10.00.1
	violator 7:7	Wednesday 1:15	64:5	18 98:1

December 13, 2006 In Re: Environmental Protection Services, Inc.

Page 120 **19** 98:1 59:22 64:3,11 **19103** 2:21 66:5 67:13 71:5 **1998** 38:2 41:20 72:15 84:4 85:9 45:19 59:20 91:8 101:15,18 87:16 94:21 101:20 102:5 **1999** 38:7,14 39:1,5 **500,000** 77:5 **515** 76:12 39:21 42:15 553 2:11 60:21 66:22 67:9 76:4,9 6 64 85:20 2nd 66:7 20(c) 75:16 7 12:4 20(c)(2)(i) 79:8 2000 35:12 51:20 72(a)(3) 61:6 100:16,20 761 7:10 8:7,12,20 2003 34:11 39:4 12:18 19:1,2,4,7 22:8 27:22 37:13 42:17 87:16 2006 1:15 3:5 **761.20** 51:8 55:12 21202 2:5 761.20(c)(i) 81:19 761.20(c)(2)(i) 56:7 23 76:4 23rd 76:9 **761.207** 36:8 46:5 24 50:16 **761.3** 17:8 73:20 77:13 84:10 98:4 240 63:7 243 17:20 102:11 761.65 44:1 **251** 63:7 761.65(b)(9) 38:11 25322 2:12 761.65(d)(f) 77:13 **26,000** 76:7 80:12 761.65(g)(9) 38:1 264.15(a)(1) 12:19 40:2 41:15 29th 38:2 761.7(2)(a) 33:1 3 761.72(a)(3) 59:13 3RC30 2:19 761.79 44:12 49:15 49:16 51:3 **3-D** 96:18 30 3:7 12:8 79(c) 72:13 32 67:19 8 36 67:20 8 36:8 80 17:12 43:5 9 40 7:10 55:11 9 36:8 401 9:6 43 79:15 **90s** 31:3 37:8 499 60:17 **98,000** 41:17 42:6,9 42:18 985 10:17 11:9 **99** 94:22 **5** 55:16 56:1 5th 105:12 5,000 34:6 40:7 63:5 68:18 **50** 17:21 20:21,22 35:8 36:14,18 45:15,22 46:3 60:17 500 18:4 44:18

46:17 56:13